CASE TITLE: JAMIU v. OLOWOLAGBA LPELR-80681(CA)
JUDGMENT DATE: 19th March, 2025
JUSTICES: YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR
GABRIEL OMONIYI KOLAWOLE
UWABUNKEONYE ONWOSI
DIVISION: IBADAN
PRACTICE AREA: TORT
FACTS:
This appeal borders on the tort of defamation.
This appeal is against the judgment of the High Court of Oyo State, Saki Judicial Division, delivered on 6th March, 2018.
The Respondent herein, the Claimant at the trial Court claimed that the Appellant defamed her at Saki town, which made people avoid her, thereby reducing the sales of her business. Sometime in July 2016, the Appellant accosted her with baseless and frivolous allegations of assassination and attempts to terminate the appellant’s life. The Appellant in the midst of many people in Saki, stated:
“ALHAJA TAIBAT, O FEE PAMI, MO JUE LO. A PAAYAN O RAN AWON A PAAYAN SIMI SUNGBO OLORUN MI JUE O LO,” meaning “ALHAJA TAIBAT, YOU AIMED AT KILLING ME, BUT I AM MORE POWERFUL THAN YOU ARE. YOU ARE A MURDERER; YOU SENT ME SOME ASSASSINS, BUT MY LORD OVERPOWERED YOU.”
She mentioned many people in the community kept looking down on her as a criminal following the defamation of her character by the Appellant. The Appellant kept on spreading her defamation to people she knows and to some she does not know within the nooks and crannies of Saki town. She further added that in the eyes of many reasonable persons in the Saki community, the Appellant has damaged her reputation, and people have started running away from her and disassociating themselves from her as a result of the defamation.
The Appellant on her own part stated that she reported the Respondent’s son and others at the Divisional Police Headquarters, Saki, via a petition for calling her a mad person in public, which is a defamatory statement. The police invited the Respondent’s son and others to their station, but the Respondent was not happy with the Appellant. Later in the day, the Respondent met the Appellant in the police station at Saki and started to rain abusive words on the Appellant and promised the Appellant death. On 11/6/2016, when the Respondent was driving her car along the road, on seeing the Appellant, she swerved her car towards the Appellant to manifest her plan. This also made the Appellant to report the Respondent to the police. The police did not give the petition, Exhibit C, prompt investigation, which made the Appellant make a report to Area Command, Oyo.
The police, however, charged and arraigned the Respondent and her son and others before the Magistrate sitting at Saki. The Magistrate struck out the charge in that the same was brought under a wrong. The Police also filed another charge, and the Magistrate Court also struck it out because the charge did not contain the offences, the law creating the offences not cited, the offences not known to law, and it lacked particulars. At the trial Court the Respondent called two witnesses, CW1 and CW2, herself testifying as CW1. The Appellant testified as DW1 and did not call any other witness. At the end of the trial, counsel adopted their final written addresses, and judgment was delivered on the 30th of May, 2018.
The Appellant being dissatisfied with the said judgment approached the Court of Appeal.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION:
The Court determined the appeal on this sole issue, thus:
“Whether the Respondent has proved the case of slander against the Appellant.”
COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS:
The Appellant’s Counsel argued that for someone to succeed in proving slander, that is, spoken word, being defamatory, the Claimant must prove the following conditions as stated in the case of YESUFU V. GBADAMOSI (1993) 6 NWLR (PT. 299) 363, 370, thus:
a. The Word of the slander
b. Publication to a third person other than the person defamed
c. The words are defamatory.
d. Must prove damages.
(a) The word of the slander.
Counsel argued that in proving the word of the slander and cause of action founded upon it, the words must be pleaded and proved. That the Appellant in her statement on oath at pages 11 to 12 stated that through Exhibit C, she reported the Respondent’s son to the police along with others for defaming her by calling her a mad person in public, and the Respondent not being a party and who was not invited by the police, went to the police station.
On the other hand, the Respondent’s Counsel in arguing his issues one and two together, cited the case of OBA GABRIEL ADEKUNLE AROMOLARAN V. DR. (REV) ROLAND OLAPADE AGORO (2015) 239 LRCN 79 @ 122 per KEKERE-EKUN, JSC, where it was stated:
“To succeed in an action for libel, the plaintiff must prove the following:
(i) publication of the material complained of to some persons, other than the person of whom it is written;
(ii) that the words complained of need not necessarily refer to him by name but would be understand by reasonable people to refer to him;
(iii) That the publication is defamatory of the plaintiff.”
Therefore, it is submitted that the case of the Claimant/Respondent at the lower Court is that the Defendant/Appellant defamed her (the Claimant/Respondent) reputation, bringing her into hatred contempt, and ridicule. The Counsel referred the Court to paragraph 6 of the Claimant’s statement of claim, paragraph 9 of the claimant’s statement on oath, and paragraph 8 of the written statement on oath of CW2 alongside the evidence adduced by the parties at the trial Court.
That in her statement of claim, particularly paragraph 6 thereof, the claimant avers thus:
“The claimant avers that, sometimes in July 2016, the defendant accosted the claimant with a baseless and frivolous allegation of assassination and attempted to terminate the defendant’s life.”
The claimant states that the defendant in the midst of many people in Saki, stated:
“Alhaja Taibat, o fee pami, mo jue lo. O ran awon appayan, o ran awon apaayan simi sugbon Olorun mi ju o lo,” meaning, “Alhaja Taibat, you aimed at killing me, but I am more powerful than you; you are a murderer; you sent me some assassins, but my Lord overpowered you.”
That in the same view, CW2 also stated:
I know as a fact that sometimes in 2016, I was present in the midst of people at SANGO AREA SAKI, where the Defendant stated to the Claimant:
“Alhaja Taibat, o fee pami, mo jue lo. O ran awon appayan, o ran awon apaayan, simi sugbon olorun mi ju o lo,” meaning, “Alhaja Taibat, you aimed at killing me, but I am more powerful than you are; you are a murderer; you sent me some assassins, but my Lords overpowered you.”
The Counsel argued that, in his judgment the lower Court stated that the witness admitted that she said that the claimant wanted to kill her and that she sent assassins to her. That the Appellant said she has reasons for saying it and that nobody could have said that she was lying, as they were shooting into the air when they came.
DECISION/HELD:
In conclusion, the Court allowed the appeal.
RATIO:
TORT- DEFAMATION: How to determine whether the words complained about in an action for defamation are defamatory
“In a matter of this nature, this Court in EGBEBU V. IZEJIOBI & ANOR (2017) LPELR-42285(CA) (PP. 11-13 PARAS. B-B) held as follows: “Is this publication a vulgar abuse or a form of defamation? What is a vulgar abuse? Okoro JSC, in CHIEF NYA EDIM EKONG V CHIEF ASUGUO E. OTOP (2014) LPELR-SC 127/2006 PP.1920, explained thus: “There is a need to emphasize that it is not every statement that is made and that annoys a person that is defamatory. It is also not every vulgar statement, mere abuse, or insult that is actionable. Thus, whenever a statement is placed before a Court to determine whether or not it is defamatory, the Court must make findings of fact as to whether the words complained of are capable of bearing defamatory meaning and then ask and find an answer to the question of whether the plaintiff was actually defamed by those words. In SKETCH PUBLISHING COMPANY LTD V AJAGBE MOKEFERI (supra), this Court held that in deciding whether a word is capable of defamatory meaning, the Court will reject that meaning that can only emerge as the product of some strained or forced or utterly unreasonable interpretation. See OKOLO V MIDWEST NEWSPAPER CORPORATION (1973) 3-4 SC. 99.” The learned trial judge in his finding held thus: “I am not at all satisfied that a reasonable reader of the article under reference will reasonably construe the words complained of in the light plaintiff has shown. It is obvious to me that before the reader starts reading, he would have noticed the caption “Rejoinder,” which appears on about all the articles showing that parties were returning “fire for fire,” as 1st Defendant put it. With this impression on the mind of the reader, the reference to the plaintiff as a “never-do-well…” will obviously be understood by him as amounting to no more than vulgar abuse. To hold otherwise is, to my mind, to abdicate one’s common sense. Although, I hold that the words complained of amount to no more than a vulgar abuse, they are nonetheless actionable on the authority of Thorley V. Kerry (1812) 128 E. R. 367 and back home on the authority of Benson V. West African Pilot Ltd. “I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusion of the learned trial Judge which is in line with the law. I agree that the publication, in view of its circumstances, was a vulgar abuse.” Per AWOTOYE, J.C.A., in Egbebu v. Izejiobi & Anor (2017) LPELR-42285(CA) (Pp. 11-13 paras. B-B). Therefore, from the facts of this case, the said statement as made by the Appellant is a mere vulgar abuse.” Per UWABUNKEONYE ONWOSI, J.C.A.
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