CASE TITLE: PHILIP v. ADSU, MUBI & ORS (2025) LPELR-81492(CA)
JUDGMENT DATE: 26TH JUNE, 2025
JUSTICES: FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO, J.C.A.
OLABODE ABIMBOLA ADEGBEHINGBE, J.C.A.
NNAMDI OKWY DIMGBA, J.C.A.
PRACTICE AREA: LABOUR LAW
FACTS:
This appeal borders on Labour Law.
This is an appeal against the judgement of the National Industrial Court, Yola Judicial Division.
The Appellant was employed by the Respondent, his employment was “subject to the University rules and regulations in force.” He continued his work with the 1st Respondent until a time when the 1st Respondent stopped paying salaries to him. The Appellant sued the Respondents asking for the following reliefs amongst others:
“i. A declaration that the non-payment or stoppage of the Claimant’s salary and other entitlements by the Defendants is illegal, null and void.
ii. An Order of the Honourable Court directing the Defendants to immediately restore the Claimant’s salaries, allowances and all other entitlements from the day of stoppage of his salaries and allowances to the date of judgment in this suit and assign duties proportionate to his position to him.”
The trial Court granted judgment in the Appellant’s favour, but omitted or refused granting orders in respect of some prayers sought by the Appellant. Aggrieved by this, the Appellant brought this appeal. /445/2018.
Being dissatisfied with the judgment, the Appellant approached the Court of Appeal.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION:
The Court determined the appeal on these issues, thus:
1. Whether the Trial Court was right to, after holding that the acts of the Defendants (herein Respondents) was a victimization of the Claimant and that the Claimant had shown good cause for absenteeism, turn round and hold that the Claimant had not proved entitlement to promotion.
2. Whether the Trial Court was right when it failed to pronounce on the claim for general damages even after holding that the Claimant’s suit was meritorious.
3. Whether the Trial Court was right when it held that the Defendants (herein Respondents) shall pay the Claimant (herein Appellant) salaries for the months of March and April, 2016 only.
COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS:
Attending to the first issue for determination, Appellant’s counsel referred to prayer 3 in the reliefs sought by the Appellant before the lower Court, which specifically requested for order mandating promotion for the Appellant. He referred to paragraphs 13-15 of the Appellant’s written statement on oath, on page 13 of the record of appeal, and the cross-examination of the Appellant. He is convinced that the evidence shows that the Appellant is entitled to the promotion demanded “as and when due”, as established in evidence, as also confirmed by exhibit CW4. He cited the cases of Ighreriniovo V. S C. C. Nigerian Ltd. [2013] All FWLR (Pt. 700) 1240 at 1244 and Jim-Jaja v. C O. P., Rivers State [2013] All FWLR (Pt. 665) 203 at 206 on the effect of unchallenged evidence. He cited the cases of Chukwu v. The State [2012] 12 SCNJ 208 at 223 and Chinwo v. Chinwo [2012] All FWLR (Pt. 656) 598 at 599 etc. on the effect of lack of cross-examination of a witness and unchallenged evidence. Learned counsel pointed at page 352 of the record of appeal, where the trial Court described the stoppage of the Appellant’s salary as a hoax and a premeditated action. He also pointed at page 355 of the record for the trial Court’s recorded opinion on the claim for promotion. He complained that the decision of the trial Court is not derived from evidence before it and should be reversed. He explained that the same defendants, who are supposed to conduct assessment and recommendation, leading to the promotion in question, are the persons the trial Court held to be perpetrators of the acts of victimization of the Appellant.
In the view of the Respondents’ counsel, an employee must merit promotion, as provided in the scheme of service – exhibit CW1F. He cited the case of A. I. Investment Limited v. Afribank Nig. Plc [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 380 at 409 and Abalogu v. S. P. D. C. Ltd. [2003] 13 NWLR (Pt. 837) 311 at 333 to make the point that the Court must confine itself to the written agreement or contract between parties in determining their rights and obligations. He referred to paragraph 111 in exhibit CW1F on promotion. Under cross-examination, the Appellant admitted that he agreed to the terms in exhibit CW1F and DWG and is bound by their contents. He cited the case of Amasike v. Reg. Gen C. A. C. [2010] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1211) 337 at 400 to submit that where there is allegation of breach of a statute, it is the duty of the Court to examine the statute, along with acts or the act complained about, to locate the alleged breach. He submitted that based on exhibit CW1F, the Appellant is not entitled to promotion, under paragraphs (iii) and (iv) at page 81 thereof and item 6.7 (ii-iii) of Part VI of exhibit DWG. He explained that the decision to defer Appellant’s promotion, in exhibit DWF was lawful. The attention of the Court was directed to Item 7.5, Part VII and the point made that the Appellant was not a diligent staff and was subjected to disciplinary procedure. Respondents’ counsel noted that the Appellant’s appeal is predicated on exhibits CW 1 and CWIF and that the lower Court was correct when it refused to grant the relief sought for promotion.
DECISION/HELD:
In the final analysis, the Court dismissed the appeal.
RATIO:
LABOUR LAW- EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP: Whether an employer can be compelled to promote its employee
“Here, the Appellant sought promotion from the Court. The word “promotion” means “a move to a more important job or rank in a company or an organization”. See Abayomi v. Saap-Tech (Nig.) Ltd. (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1706) 453 at 500. Promotions are based on standard grades in an establishment. See Unijos v. Ikegwuoha (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1360) 478 at 505-506 (per Galadima, J. S. C.). In my view, the lower Court appropriately stated the position of the Courts concerning claims for promotion in the circumstances of this appeal. Courts are not equipped to justly and summarily dish out orders directing promotions to be carried out by employers in favour of litigating employees, except Courts are clearly empowered, through statutes, to do so, in well thought out circmstances. A few examples will suffice here. In the case of Nwoye v. FAAN (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1665) 193 at 218 (per Kekere-Ekun, J. S. C. – as he then was), it was stated: “Promotion from one level or position in an organization to another is not a right but a privilege, which is earned. An employer cannot be compelled to promote its employee no matter the good opinion the employee might have of himself.” In the same case, Nwoye v. FAAN (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1665) 193 at 208 (per Sanusi, J. S. C.), it was stated: “To my understanding, in this relief, the plaintiff was simply asking the trial Court to, in a disguised way, promote him to a position contemporaries are holding and/or make him to benefit from the salaries and other entitlements of his supposed contemporaries then holding the rank of Assistant Electrical Superintendents. It is elementary to say that the trial Court is not the plaintiff’s employer, since his employers i.e. the defendant/respondent, had never so promoted him or grant him that relief more especially because no evidence was led before it to show that he really deserved or is entitled to that anticipated promotion or rank. Perhaps it is sequel to that, that the trial Court in refusing to grant that relief held as below:- “This relief is like making a “tall order” promotion is a privilege granted on employee at the discretion of the employer thus the Court cannot compel an employer to promote his employee….” It is my candid view therefore, that the trial Court was right in refusing to grant relief No. 2 and by extension the Court below is also correct in upholding the trial Court’s refusal to grant the said relief No. 2.” Also, in the case of Shell Pet. Dev. v. Nwawka (2001) 10 NWLR (Pt. 720) 64 at 84 (per Pats-Acholonu, J. C. A. – as he then was), said: “The respondent is asking in claim 1 that he is entitled to the post of Development Director. How can the Court declare to the 1st appellant who to make a Development Director. That is essentially within the province of the 1st appellant. It will amount to the Court unwittingly interfering into the internal administration of the 1st appellant. It may well be that the respondent in his qualification and experience is qualified and suitable for such a position but it will be invidious for the Court to foist on the 1st appellant a person who should occupy a particular position. Having so posited, I shall strike out this particular claim. Claim 1 is hereby struck out.” Per ADEGBEHINGBE, J.C.A.
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