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CASE TITLE: INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF AFRICAN CENTRE FOR MEDIA & INFORMATION LITERACY v. CCB & ANOR (2024) LPELR-61839(CA)
JUDGMENT DATE: 15TH MARCH, 2024
JUSTICES: HAMMA AKAWU BARKA, JCA.
ABBA BELLO MOHAMMED, JCA.
OKON EFRETI ABANG, JCA.
DIVISION: ABUJA
PRACTICE AREA: GOVERNMENT AGENCY
FACTS:
This appeal challenges the judgment of the Federal High Court, Abuja, delivered on November 14, 2017.
The case began when the appellant, on January 18, 2017, requested information on the asset declarations of certain past and current Principal Officers of the Senate and House of Representatives under the Freedom of Information Act 2011. The Respondents received the request on February 7, 2017, but failed to provide the requested information. Aggrieved by this inaction, the appellant filed a suit to enforce its right to information.
The appellant argued that it had the right to request the information, which was not exempt under the Freedom of Information Act or any other law. The appellant clarified that it did not seek to inspect the declarations of assets as per Paragraph 3(c) Part 1 of the 3rd Schedule to the Constitution. Instead, it sought information on the number of principal officers who complied with asset declaration requirements and copies of the written declarations submitted by these officers.
The trial Court heard the case on its merits and ultimately dismissed the appellant’s claim. Dissatisfied with this decision, the appellant filed the present appeal.
ISSUE(S) FOR DETERMINATION:
The Court adopted the lone issue formulated by the Appellant in the determination of the appeal;
“Whether taking the applicable laws and relevant facts of the instant action into consideration, the Learned trial Judge was not wrong to have refused to grant the reliefs sought by the appellant therein.”.
COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS:
The learned Counsel for the appellant argued that Paragraph 3(a) Part 1 of the 3rd Schedule to the Constitution and Section 3(a) of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act authorize the 1st Respondent to receive and keep asset declarations from public officers. He stated that Part 2 of the 5th Schedule to the Constitution defines public officers, including members of the legislative houses, and mandates these officers to submit written asset declarations to the 1st Respondent upon assuming and leaving office. These declarations become part of public records under the Freedom of Information Act and should be disclosed upon public demand.
The Counsel emphasized that Sections 1(1), 2(2), and 9(2) of the Freedom of Information Act guarantee the right to request and obtain information from public institutions, including the 1st Respondent. He argued that Sections 1(1&3) and 20 of the Act entitle the appellant to file a lawsuit if the Respondent refuses to disclose the requested information. The Counsel contended that the trial Judge erred in dismissing the appellant’s case, as the appellant had fulfilled all requirements under the Freedom of Information Act for the reliefs sought.
He further referenced Paragraph 3(c) Part 1 of the 3rd Schedule to the Constitution and Section 3(c) of the Code of Conduct Bureau Act, which empower the National Assembly to prescribe conditions for making asset declarations available for inspection. He asserted that the Freedom of Information Act sufficiently covers this purpose, negating the need for additional laws.
The Counsel reiterated that both the Respondents and the asset declaration information are subject to the Freedom of Information Act. He noted that the appellant had the right to request information from the Respondents and had cause of action when the Respondents refused to supply the requested information. He distinguished between the “inspection” of asset declarations under the Constitution and the disclosure of information under the Freedom of Information Act, arguing that the trial Court misunderstood this distinction.
Citing several cases, the Counsel concluded that the Freedom of Information Act is independent and not contingent on any terms prescribed by the National Assembly for inspecting asset declarations. He criticized the trial Court for failing to evaluate the affidavit evidence and submissions properly, thus denying the appellant a fair hearing. In response, the Respondent argued that until the National Assembly prescribes the terms and conditions specified in Paragraph 3(c) Part 1 of the 3rd Schedule to the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the Respondents cannot be compelled to disclose the information requested by the Appellant because it pertains to the declaration of assets.
DECISION/HELD:
In the final analysis, the appeal lacked merit, and it was accordingly dismissed.
RATIO:
GOVERNMENT AGENCY – CODE Conduct CONDUCT BUREAU: Position of the law regarding the right of a person to access or request information in the custody of Public Agencies/Code of Conduct Bureau; instance where the Code of Conduct Bureau will have the power to decline such request
“I need to restate that by Paragraph 3(a) and (c) of Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the Code of Conduct Bureau is empowered to receive declaration of assets by public officers and to retain custody of such declarations and make them available for inspection by any citizen of Nigeria on such terms and conditions as the National Assembly may prescribe. By the wordings in Paragraph 3(c), specifically provides that the inspection of such declarations shall be on such terms and conditions as the National Assembly may prescribe. The right to inspect declarations must therefore be in accordance with the terms and conditions prescribed by the National Assembly. In other words, the Paragraph imposes a duty on the National Assembly to specifically prescribe terms and conditions for the inspection of asset declarations of public officers by any citizen of Nigeria. Paragraph 3(c) also imposes a duty on the Code of Conduct Bureau to only allow inspection of declarations based on the terms and conditions prescribed by the National Assembly under Paragraph 3(c) of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution. This is because where a statute prescribes a particular method of performing a duty, that method and no other must be adopted: CO-OPERATIVE & COMMERCE BANK (NIG) PLC v AG ANAMBRA STATE & ANOR (1992) LPELR-875(SC) at 47, paras. E – E. Thus, until the National Assembly specifically prescribes the terms and conditions on the fulfilment of which asset declarations may be inspected as required by Paragraph 3(c) of Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, the general provisions in the Freedom of Information Act cannot be employed for such inspection, was contended by the Appellant before the trial Court and in this appeal.” Per Mohamed, J.C.A
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