When Time Commences for Computation of Limitation Period in Pre-Election Matter

CASE TITLE:       YPP v. APGA & ORS (2023) LPELR-59804(CA)

JUDGMENT DATE:      17TH FEBRUARY, 2023

JUSTICES:                   JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JCA

FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO, JCA

PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, JCA

DIVISION: AWKA

PRACTICE AREA:           PRE-ELECTION MATTERS

FACTS:

This is an appeal against the judgment of the Federal High Court. The Appellant argued that the primary election of the 1st Respondent, which took place outside the designated Federal Constituency, was irregular. The Appellant sought a declaration that the 3rd Defendant (INEC) had an obligation to enforce the provisions of the Electoral Act and not accept candidates from primaries held outside the mandatory requirements. The 1st and 2nd Defendants filed counter affidavits and preliminary objections challenging the Appellant’s locus standi (legal standing) and claiming that the matter was statute barred. The 3rd Defendant (INEC) did not respond to the claim. The trial judge upheld the preliminary objections, ruling that the Appellant lacked locus standi and that the action was statute barred. The judge also dismissed the suit on its merits and awarded costs in favor of the Respondents. Dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

ISSUES:

The Court of Appeal determined the appeal based on the following issues:

1. Whether the trial Court was right when it held that the Appellant lacks the locus standi to bring the suit?

2. Whether the trial Court was right when it held that the Appellant’s suit is statute-barred?

3. Whether the trial Court was right when it held that the 1st Respondent substantially complied with the provisions of Section 84 (5) (c) (i) and (ii) of the Electoral Act, 2022 and that the provisions were not mandatory but directory?

4. Whether the trial Court was right when it awarded the cost of N1,000,000 each in favour of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents against the Appellant.

The 2nd Respondent’s raised a Notice of Preliminary Objection challenging the competence of the appeal. Therein three issues for determination were formulated as follows:

1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he held that the Appellant lacks the locus standi to maintain the action which gave rise to the present appeal.  

2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he held that the Appellant’s suit is statute-barred.

3. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the Appellant’s suit having regard to the evidence before the Court and the entire circumstances of the case.  

COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS:

​On the issue of statute bar, the Appellant’s Counsel argued that the cause of action in this case arose when INEC failed to perform its duty under the Electoral Act. He cited various cases to support this contention that the cause of action should not be determined solely based on the date of the primary election. He further submitted that since the primary election conducted by the 1st Respondent was void for being conducted outside the constituency, it does not fall within the scope of the statute of limitations. He urged the Court to consider the filing date of the suit and conclude that it is not statute-barred.

The 1st Respondent’s Counsel countered by stating that the Appellant’s reliefs and supporting affidavit clearly indicate that the suit was challenging the primary election conducted by the 1st Respondent. He argued that since the suit was filed more than 14 days after the primary election, it is statute-barred under Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution. They disputed the applicability of the cases cited by the Appellant’s Counsel and accused the Appellant of attempting to legitimize an incompetent suit.

The 2nd Respondent’s Counsel referred to Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution and argued that pre-election matters must be initiated within 14 days from the occurrence of the event complained of. He contended that the nomination process was complete when INEC received the name of the candidate and relevant documents, which was before the filing of the suit. He disputed the relevance of the cases cited by the Appellant’s Counsel and urged the Court to consider the filing date of the suit, which he claimed falls within the 14-day period stipulated by law. The 2nd Respondent’s Counsel requested the Court to rule in their favor, supporting the argument that the suit is statute-barred based on the 14-day time limit for pre-election matters.

DECISION/HELD:

The appeal was dismissed. The preliminary objection was upheld.

RATIO:

ELECTORAL MATTERS – PRE-ELECTION MATTERS: Whether knowledge/awareness of the occurrence of the event/decision/action complained of is material in the determination of when time begins to run to institute a pre-election matter

“The law on computation of time for limitation period for commencing actions has continued to evolve. It is no longer the law in computing time in pre-election matters to countenance knowledge of the plaintiff of when the event complained of occurred. What is material being when the event, decision or action complained of occurred irrespective of whether the plaintiff claimed to know of it then or not. The most important and current authority on this issue is the case of ABDULLAHI V LOKO & ORS (2022) LPELR – 57578 (SC). This is not only because it is the locus classicus on this point but also because in it the Apex Court unequivocally departed from its earlier decisions which placed emphasis on the knowledge of the plaintiff rather than the date of the occurrence of the event. In that case, Jauro, JSC held as follows:

“It should be noted that in determining whether a pre-election matter is statute-barred, some of our past decisions to wit; MOHAMMED SANI MUSA V DAVID UMAR & ORS (2020) II NWLR (Pt 1735); SAKI V ARC (2022) I; NWLR (PT 1705) 8254 have placed emphasis on the fact that it is reasonable to say that the cause of action occurred when the aggrieved party became aware of his replacement with another. In those decisions, this Court was of the view that the cause of action occurs when the aspirant first declared winner of party primary election becomes aware that he has been replaced as winner of the said primary or its candidate for the election. This is because such awareness occurred actually or constructively, only when another name was substituted by the party to INEC or the list was published by INEC. This Court has moved from the above position and it is currently of the view that it is the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or the action complained of that is to be reckoned with and not the date the aggrieved party became aware of the event decision or complained of. In BELLO V YUSUF & ORS (2019) LPELR – 47918 (SC), the Court, per Musa Dattijo Muhammed, JSC (delivering the lead judgment) held as follows: “I am unable to agree with the learned counsel that appellant’s cause of action begins to run, by virtue of the limitation prescribed under Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution, as altered, from the time he becomes aware of 1st respondent’s non-compliance which, on the latter’s participation in the primary election, creates appellant’s right to sue. The clear unambiguous section neither makes knowledge on the part of the appellant a pre-condition to the filing of his action nor excludes the date his cause of action accrues in the determination of when time begins to run against him. By the Section, appellant’s knowledge of 1st respondent’s non-compliance with 2nd Respondent’s constitution and Electoral Guidelines is immaterial. To hold that time begins to run against the appellant only on his becoming aware of 1st Respondent’s cause of action accrues, in determining when limitation begins to run against him, is to read into the section what it does not contain. No Court has the jurisdiction of doing so. See DANGANA & ANOR V USMAN & ORS (2012) LPELR – 25012 (SC) and GANA V SDP & ORS (2019) LPELR – 47153 (SC). By the section, the limitation period is 14 days and since neither knowledge nor the date of the accrual of the cause of action is made a precondition for the determination of the period, the lower Court in excluding Appellant’s knowledge of 1st respondent’s non-compliance and taking into cognizance the date his cause of action arises in its computation of the limitation period is beyond reproach”. The approach of the Court in the aforementioned case was also recently adopted in the case of HON. MURTALA USMAN KARSHI & ORS. V HON. SULEIMAN GWAGWA & ORS. Appeal No. SC. 1166/2021, delivered on 10th February, 2022, wherein my learned brother, Agim JSC after reviewing the former position as reflected in APC V LERE; MUSA V UMAR and SAKI V APC (supra), made it expressly clear that in the computation of time, the knowledge of the claimant regarding the event, decision and action complained of is irrelevant”.

The lower Court in this case used the 17th June, 2022, the last date for submission of the name and particulars of the 2nd Respondent to INEC by the 1st Respondent. This is still in line with the decisions in APC V ELEBEKE (2022)10 NWLR, PT 1837,1; KUBOR V DICKSON (2013) 4 NWLR, PT 1345, 534 and GWEDE V INEC (2014) 18 NWLR, PT 1438, 56. These decisions held that nomination is complete upon INEC’s receipt of the name of the political party for the election, his completed and signed Form EC9 and accompanying documents. It is apparent from the Appellant’s affidavit that their complaint is against the validity of the 2nd Respondent’s nomination. The judicially accepted date is either 27th May or 17th June, 2022. By either date, the Appellant who filed his claim on the 7th of July is caught up by the limitation period of 14 days. His action is therefore statute barred.

The Appellant’s contention is that it is the 24th June, 2022 when INEC published the personal particulars of the 2nd Respondent that should be reckoned with in computing time, by which time his claim filed on the 7th July is within the 14 days and valid. This contention is appropriately answered by the Apex Court when it held in the case of KUBOR V DICKSON (SUPRA) per Onnoghen, JSC (as he then was):

“…publication of names of candidates by 3rd respondent (INEC) is not evidence of sponsorship by a political party which nominated the candidates. Evidence of nomination and sponsorship of a candidate by a political party lies in the declaration of the winner of the party’s primary election conducted to elect the party’s candidate for the general election in question coupled with the political party forwarding the names of the said elected candidate to the 3rd respondent as its nominated candidate for the election.” Per MAHMOUD, J.C.A.