March 28, 2024

3 thoughts on “THINGS YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE NEW POLICE ACT, 2020

  1. lawpavilion, in your article from online source https://lawpavilion.com/blog/things-you-should-know-about-the-new-police-act-2020/ titled “THINGS YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE NEW POLICE ACT, 2020” under the sub title What is new? – 9. Prosecution by a Police Officer reproduce thus “Whereas in the Police Act of 2004 [10], the Police are empowered to prosecute a case in any court in Nigeria; in the new Act, the right to prosecute has been redefined such that only police officers who are legal practitioners have the right to prosecute any form of offence in any court while those who are not legal practitioners can only prosecute offences which non-qualified legal practitioners are allowed to prosecute under the relevant criminal procedure laws in force at the Federal or State level [11]. “

    I strongly disagree with the above viewpoint of yours base on the following hard facts or reasons

    1. That it is settled that statutory provision must be interpreted/construed holistically or as a whole, but not in isolation or disjointedly, in order to ascertain the intention of the legislature inter alia the provision of section 66 Nigeria Police Act 2020 must be interpreted/construed holistically or as a whole, thus place reliance in the supreme court decision as per stare decisis/judicial precedent in a case of Oni & Ors.v. Gov., Ekiti state (2019) Vol.298 LRCN 190 @ 203 : 13(SC) “On The Need To Interpret Documents And Statutes Holistically” wherein it was held that “it is also a basic principle that documents and statutes are to be interpreted holistically.” Also See-W.R.P. Co. Ltd. v. Gecmep Nig. Ltd. (2020) Vol.301 LRCN 203 @ 208 : 4(SC) “On How The Interpretation Of A Statutory Provision Should Be Construed” wherein it was held that “It is well settled that in the interpretation of a statutory provision, it should not be considered in isolation or disjointedly, in order to ascertain the intention of the legislature. It must be construed as a whole.” See:(I) S.P.D.C. v. Isaiah (1997) 6NWLR (Pt.505) 236; (II) Obi v. INEC (2007) 11 NWLR.(Pt.1046) 565; (2008) 155 LRCN/EPJ 58;(III) Chime & Amor. v. Ude & Ors. (1996) LPELR 848 (SC) at 15 B-C. Therefore in the light of the above legal authorities/stare decisis binding every court of law, it is obvious that the legislature using the words or phrase “whether or not the information or complaint is laid in his name” in section 66(1) and did not use same in 66(2), does not implies, infers or means that it is not applicable to section 66(2) of the same provision of section 66 Nigeria Police Act 2020 holistically, also the legislature using the words or phrase “subject to the provisions of the relevant criminal procedure laws in force at the Federal or State level” in section 66(2) and did not use same in 66(1), does not implies, infers or means that it is not applicable to section 66(1) of the same provision of section 66 Nigeria Police Act 2020 holistically, hence your interpretation/construction of the provision of section 66 Nigeria Police Act 2020 is wrong except to the extent of your phrase/averment inferring to the effect that non-qualified legal practitioners are allowed to prosecute under the relevant criminal procedure laws in force at the Federal or State level is correct, unlike some people out of ignorance speculating that only “Police officer who is a legal practitioner” mentioned in section 66(1) can prosecute in court and that “Police officer” vis-à-vis “non-qualified legal practitioners” mentioned in section 66(2) cannot prosecute in court under the same provision of section 66 Nigeria Police Act 2020 holistically, despite clear and unambiguous words “can prosecute” insert or used in the extant Police Act by the legislature/draftsmen, and of which the legislature also using the words or phrase “any other written law” in section 32(3) Nigeria Police Act 2020 clearly include or absorb FRN ACJA 2015 at federal level or Abia State ACJL 2017 at state level among others such as CPA/CPL, Criminal Codes etc as any written law upon which a suspect shall be brought before the court to be tried or dealt with inter alia the legislature using the words or phrase “subject to the provisions of the relevant criminal procedure laws in force at the Federal or State level” in section 66(2) Nigeria Police Act 2020 clearly absorb, encapsulate or engross section 268(1)(2)FRN ACJA 2015 or section 265(1)(2)Abia state ACJL 2017 as the provisions of the relevant criminal procedure laws in force at the Federal or State level respectively, hence justify “Police officer” vis-à-vis “non qualified legal practitioners” power to prosecute in court under section 66(2) or 66 Nigeria police Act 2020 holistically, yet people out of ignorance speculate that only “Police officer who is a legal practitioner” mentioned in section 66(1) can prosecute in court and that “Police officer” vis-à-vis “non-qualified legal practitioners” mentioned in section 66(2) cannot prosecute in court under the same provision of section 66 Nigeria Police Act 2020 holistically, likewise people out of ignorance speculating that “Police officer” vis-à-vis “Public officer” in official capacity can no longer prosecute in court under the new FRN ACJA at federal level and ACJL at state level which is absolutely wrong to envisaged and used section 106 FRN ACJA 2015 or 104 Abia state ACJL 2017 which as to do with the Powers of Attorney General ab initio as a vehicle of fraud/destruction to denied or deprived “Police officer” vis-à-vis “Public officer” of accrued statutory right to institute proceedings in respect of an offence and prosecute same in official capacity in the name of IGP or COP under the express provision of 268(1)(2) FRN ACJA 2015 at federal or section 265(1)(2) Abia state ACJL 2017, of which it is trite law that the court or counsel cannot waive substantial compliance with the statutory provisions; See-Okolie Vs Aneke(2019) 17 NWLR (pt.1700) 90 @ 92 : 2(SC) “On Whether The Court Or Counsel Can Waive Substantial Compliance With Statutory Provisions” wherein it was held that “Neither the court nor counsel for the parties on their own can waive substantial compliance with statutory provisions, nor confer nonexistent rights and privileges on themselves which ordinarily circumvent the wheels of justice, even when adversary has acquiesced to that wrongful procedure.” inter alia court or counsel cannot waive substantial compliance with the statutory provisions of section 66(2) or 66 Nigeria Police Act 2020 holistically, section 268(1)(2) or 268 FRN ACJA 2015 holistically and section 265(1)(2) or 265 Abia state ACJL 2017 holistically, even when adversary like myself, IGP, COP, O/c legal and any other person has acquiesced to that wrongful procedure. Also See-Saraki Vs F.R.N (2018)16 NWLR (pt.1646) 405 @ 425 : 35 “On Need To Comply Strictly With Statutory Provisions” wherein it was held that “when the law directs that an act be done in a particular way, unless the act was done in that particular way prescribed, such an act done otherwise is illegal.”

    2. That the legislature/draftsmen having mentioned “Police officer who is a legal practitioner” in section 66(1) and “Police officer” vis-à-vis “non-qualified legal practitioners” in section 66(2) confers with the power to prosecute respectively under the same section 66 Nigeria Police Act 2020 excludes others, upon application of the literal rule of statutory interpretation to the clear and unambiguous words used in the extant Police Act and rule of language or maxims “Expressio Unius Est Exclusio” and taking solace in the supreme court decision as per stare decisis/judicial precedent in a case of Oni & Ors.v. Gov., Ekiti state (2019) Vol.298 LRCN 190 @ 202 : 11(SC) “On The Meaning Of The Latin Maxims” “Expressio Unius Est Exclusio” wherein it was held that “One of the maxims of statutory interpretation is expressio unius est exclusio (express mention of one thing excludes others), i.e although there is no express exclusion, exclusion is implied.” Hence the express mention of “Police officers who a legal practitioner” and “Police officer” vis-à-vis “non-qualified legal practitioners” in section 66(1)&(2) or 66 Nigeria Police Act 2020 holistically excludes others, i.e although there is no express exclusion, exclusion is implied.”

    3. That the legislature using the words or phrase “those offences” in section 66(2) and did not use same in 66(1), does not implies, infers or means that it is not applicable to section 66(1) of the same provision of section 66 Nigeria Police Act 2020 holistically, thus the legislature / draftsman having deliberately not mentioned those offences which “Police officers who is a legal practitioner” can prosecute under section 66(1) and those offences which “Police officer” vis-à-vis “non-qualified legal practitioners” can prosecute under section 66(2), implies, infers or means that there is no offence or offences the two category of police officer i.e “Police officers who a legal practitioner” and “Police officer” vis-à-vis “non-qualified legal practitioners” cannot prosecute under section 66(1)&(2) or 66 Nigeria Police Act 2020 holistically, because no offence is expressly prohibited therein and what is not expressly prohibited is implicitly permitted in law, and upon application of the literal rule of statutory interpretation and rule of language or maxims “Expressio Unius Est Exclusio” and taking solace in the supreme court decision as per stare decisis/judicial precedent in a case of Oni & Ors.v. Gov., Ekiti state (2019) Vol.298 LRCN 190 @ 202 : 12(SC) “On when an implied exclusion argument lies” wherein it was held that “An implied exclusion argument lies whenever there is reason to believe that if the legislature meant to include a particular thing within the ambit of a statute, it would have referred to that thing and because of this expectation its failure to mention that thing becomes grounds for inferring that it was deliberately excluded. Simply put, the express mention of one thing in any statutory provision automatically excludes any other, which otherwise, would have applied by implication with regard to the same issue” inter alia failure of legislature to mention those offences in section 66 sub(1)&(2) or 66 Nigeria Police Act 2020 holistically was deliberate and becomes grounds for inferring that no offence(s) was excluded or prohibited for prosecution which implies that there is no offence that cannot be prosecuted by the two category of Police officers mentioned therein i.e “Police officer who is a legal Practitioner” and “Police Officer” vis-à-vis “non-qualified legal practitioners” under the provision of section 66 sub(1)&(2) or 66 Nigeria Police Act 2020 holistically, because no offence is expressly prohibited therein and what is not expressly prohibited is implicitly permitted in law. See-Supreme Court decision as per stare decisis in the case of Mumini Vs FRN (2018) Vol.283 LRCN 227(para.Z-EE)

    4. That even a court of law with competent jurisdiction cannot read or import into statutory provision words not used by the legislature, but you did so in your article/phrase reproduce thus “only police officers who are legal practitioners have the right to prosecute any form of offence in any court” & by using the words/phrase “any form of offence” therein, you have read or import into statutory provision of section 66 Nigeria Police Act 2020 words/phrase not used by the legislature/draftsmen, despite clear and unambiguous words used by the legislature, hence introduce an illegal back door amendment and go against the literal rule of statutory interpretation, principle governing interpretation of statutory provision and common law as per stare decisis/judicial precedent in a case of Emejuru & Anr. Vs Abraham & Ors (2019) Vol.293 LRCN 216 @ 225 : 16 (SC) “On Whether Court Can Play The Role Of The Legislature When Interpreting The Law” “The court, in any guise of exercising its interpretative jurisdiction, is not permitted to play the role of the legislature. It is not permitted to place a gloss on the provisions by reading or importing into the provisions extraneous matters or words not used by the legislature in enacting the provisions in the first place.” Also See-Ecobank Nig.Ltd Vs Honeywell F.M.Plc (2018) Vol.283 LRCN 1 @ 17 : 11(SC) “On The Duty Of A Court When Interpreting Statutes” The law is well settled that in interpreting Statutes, the Court should always give them their ordinary meaning. Where it is clear, unambiguous and direct to the point any addition or subtraction will be sequel to introducing an illegal back door amendment. Also See-Bello v. Yusuf & Ors (2020) Vol.304 LRCN 143 @ 157 : 14(SC) “On The Basic Function Of The Court To Declare What The Law Is And Not To Make Law” wherein it was held that “The Court, in its interpretative jurisdiction, is enjoined, when the provisions of the constitution or Statute are clear and unambiguous, to give the provisions the meaning that accords with the natural ordinary grammatical meaning of the provisions. In other words, the Court must not construe the provisions to mean what the provisions do not actually mean. Nor must the provisions be construed not to mean what they actually mean. This interpretational restraint on the Court is an outflow from the basic function of the court which is only to declare what the law is, and not to make laws. Legislation or law making constitutionally belongs to another branch of government, but not to the judicature.”

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