THE WEAKENING GHOST OF OKAFOR V NWEKE: JUSTICE AGIM’S ROADMAP AND THE 2025 JUDICIAL RETREAT

By: Kola’ Awodein SAN, FCTI, FICIArb (kaaobm15@gmail.com) and Misbau Alamu Lateef, Ph.D., SFHEA (mislaw178@yahoo.com)

“This Court is again faced with a situation where a plaintiff’s 25 year pursuit of justice… is sought to be nullified by an objection raised for the first time in this Court… on the ground that an unnamed legal practitioner in the firm signed the application to issue the writ of summons …..when at the date the writ was filed the prevailing legal regime established then by the decisions of this Court in Cole V Martins …permitted the signing of Court processes in that manner ….In Solumade & Ors V Kuti & Ors (SC/327/2010 decided on 11-6-2021) I held thus ‘The suit leading to this appeal was filed on 19-10-1998. Litigation in this case has lasted over 23 years from that date from the trial Court through the Court of Appeal to this Court. If the Appellant had raised this issue of noncompliance with Order 2 rules 1 and 2 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure Rules 1994) within the time limited by Order 2 rule 2 it would have been determined in limine before the applicant filed his statement of defense or at the trial. If the objection is upheld, it would frustrate the respondents’ 23 years quest for justice in the Courts and make a mockery of the Courts. It would disrepute the Court to wait till after 23 years of litigating in three Courts to tell the claimants that an originating process they filed 23 years ago is incompetent for non-compliance with the rules of Court and that for that reason all the proceedings of the two Courts and the judgement of the Court of Appeal in their favour are nullified. It is obvious that at this stage the respondents who would have exhausted much of their resources, would have become litigation weary and too exhausted to commence another case. Such a situation makes fair hearing of the case within a reasonable time impossible and violates Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution.’”EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, JSC (Dissenting) – Network Securities Ltd v Dahiru & Ors (2022) LPELR-57835(SC) at page 20-21.

“Where this Court has decided a matter in error, particularly where the error arose from deciding the case in ignorance of a binding precedent, it is the duty of this Court to correct that error. As this Court held in Veepee Industries Ltd v Cocoa Industries Ltd, it is better to admit an error than to persevere in error. Continuous adherence to Okafor v Nweke in the face of the earlier decision in Cole v Martins and in the face of the manifest injustice it occasions cannot be justified. The majority’s decision in this case perpetuates that error and visits its consequences on an innocent litigant who has done nothing wrong but pursue his legal rights through the courts for 25 years. This is not justice. I would dismiss this appeal.” – EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, JSC (Dissenting) – Network Securities Ltd v Dahiru & Ors (Supra).

“The essence of the Legal Practitioners Act, originally enacted in 1962, is to regulate the legal profession in Nigeria by ensuring that only qualified persons… are permitted to engage in legal practice… Consequently, once the name of a person is identifiable as a legal practitioner, the requirements of Section 2(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act are deemed to have been satisfied.” – MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, JSC – lead judgement in Olowe & Anor v Aluko (2025) LPELR-81320(SC).

 “…….The latest 2025 decisions demonstrate that the Supreme Court in its majority now understands what Justices  Ejembi-Eko and Justice Agim fully understood in their most powerful dissents. The days of Okafor v Nweke’s unquestioned and seemingly unquestionable dominance appears gradually to be numbered…….Yet, the challenge is that,  there are still hundreds of cases, slowly grinding their way, , through our congested Court system, to the Apex Court , in which the Originating processes such as the writ of summons or Originating Summons etc were signed or executed like in Okafor.

 ……the prevalence of Okafor, in spite of the 2025 decisions, remains most troubling… the interest of Justice can only be best served , if Okafor is completely departed from and decisively overruled….. The Apex  Court has a judicial duty to confront and redress, at the earliest opportunity, the monumental injustices of Okafor and the havoc it has and continues to wreak. When the Kere-Ekun led Court properly exercises its authority, in an appropriate case , to explicitly overrule Okafor and depart from its legal precedent , History will remember it and celebrate the decision,  as a classic example of a Court , remarkably willing to assume the necessary fortitude,  to  terminate the perpetuation , of the Apex Court ‘s most egregious error “ —-Kola’  Awodein & Misbau Lateef, [January 2026. ]

I. INTRODUCTION

1. For nearly two decades, the Nigerian legal system has grappled with one of the most troubling decisions in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court: the case of Okafor v Nweke[1]. This 2007 decision, which held that court processes signed by “J.H.C. OKOLO SAN & CO.” were invalid on the grounds that a law firm is not a legal practitioner recognised by law, has spawned what can only be described as a crisis of justice in Nigerian courts. Countless litigants who diligently pursued their claims through the trial courts and Courts of Appeal have seen their victories snatched away at the Supreme Court, not because their cases lacked merit, but because of a technical irregularity in how their legal representatives signed originating processes, years earlier and in some cases up to 20 years or more earlier.

2. However, in recent years, individual Justices of the Supreme Court began to question the rigid application of Okafor and sought to weaken its consequences. Justice Ejembi Eko delivered first a powerful dissenting judgment in Ajibode & Others v Gbadamosi & Others[2] in 2021, where faced with an objection based on Okafor and raised for the first time only at the Supreme Court, he insisted that any irregularities as regards the originating processes in the case raised a procedural jurisdictional matter which must be deemed to have been waived. He then characterized the majority view that entertained the objection and upheld it based on Okafor as constituting “crass technicality” that defeats substantial justice. Then, in 2022, Justice Emmanuel Akomaye Agim delivered an even more comprehensive dissenting judgment in Network Securities Ltd v Dahiru & Ors[3] – a judgment that provided a complete roadmap for the Supreme Court to depart from Okafor and restore justice to this troubling area of Nigerian procedural law.

3. Remarkably, within six weeks of each other in 2025, the Supreme Court delivered two decisions that signal a significant judicial retreat from the rigid formalism of Okafor v Nweke but still did not reverse Okafor. In Federal Housing Authority v Oyedeji & Ors[4] (11 April 2025), the Court clarified that the strict signing requirement applies only to originating processes proper – not to statements of claim – (a position which Ejembi Eko JSC (as he then was) had rightly rejected in his dissentient in Ajibode (Supra) as aforementioned by insisting that it applies to originating processes as well), and that procedural defects are waivable through participation without previous complaint or objections. In Olowe & Anor v Aluko[5] (23 May 2025), the Apex Court held that where the signatory is identifiable as a qualified legal practitioner, the statutory requirement is satisfied regardless of format. Together, these decisions substantially embrace the intellectual framework that Justice Agim in particular and Justice Ejembi Eko had articulated in their referenced dissents.

4. This article examines the journey from Justice Agim’s dissent to the 2025 seeming judicial retreat of the Supreme Court from the troubling ghost of Okafor. We argue that the Supreme Court has now substantially embraced, in substance if not in express terms, the roadmap that Justice Agim provided. Thus, the ghost of Okafor v Nweke has been weakened – though, crucially, it has not been overruled or reversed and therefore not yet exorcised. The referenced 2025 decisions of the Apex Court represent a retreat, not a reversal. As we shall demonstrate, these decisions, while welcome, remain incomplete: they do not overrule or effectively reverse Okafor, and they cannot resurrect cases already struck out. Arguably, they fail to acknowledge that in this era of digital verification, the entire signature framework is in a sense somewhat an anachronism.

5. To be clear, the decision in Okafor has proven to be not merely incorrect, but demonstrably per incuriam – reached in ignorance of a binding precedent of the same Supreme Court in Cole v Martins[6], which had addressed substantially identical facts and reached the opposite conclusion. Yet despite this fundamental flaw, and despite the manifest injustice it has occasioned, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to overrule Okafor, even when presented with a Full Court and eleven amici curiae in the 2012 case of FBN v Maiwada[7].

6. In an article first published by Law Pavilion in 2021 and titled “Has a Daniel Come to Judgement?[8]”, Kola’ Awodein SAN and Seyi Sowemimo SAN argued that the decision in Okafor v Nweke, which had then been followed in so many subsequent cases, must be regarded as having been decided per incuriam in that it did not consider at all a previously binding decision of the Apex Court in Cole v Martins. The authors contended in the article thus:

“There is perhaps arguably no judgement of the Apex Court that appears to be so seemingly unjust than the many recurring judgements of the Court that have repeatedly nullified otherwise well-conducted trials and outcomes simply on the basis of the allegedly improperly signed originating and other Court processes.

Starting from the disconcerting decision of the Court per Onnoghen JSC (as he then was) who delivered the lead judgment in the now notorious case of Okafor v Nweke, the Apex Court has continually and almost immovably, taken the position that a writ or other processes, apparently signed by a legal practitioner but without inserting the name of the legal Practitioner, is worthless and that such failure is a jurisdictional matter that can be raised at any time, even at the Supreme Court for the first time, and that, it nullifies the entire proceedings.

In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has wholly rejected arguments that sought to persuade the Court to reverse its position in Okafor’s case and/or the principle said to be enunciated therein.

It has apparently not mattered to the Apex Court that all those who abided by and applied an earlier Supreme Court case of Cole v Martins & Anor (which was not considered at all in Okafor’s case and which was on similar facts as in Okafor’s case) ought not to be penalized for following the law as laid down by the very same Supreme Court in Cole v Martins & Anor.

Yet, in no reported case on this subject has the Supreme Court, either overruled Cole v Martins or suggested or held that it is bad law. Even though, in SLB Consortium v NNPC[9], Fabiyi JSC in his concurring judgment made a reference that Cole v Martins was decided per incuriam of Sections 2 and 19 of the Legal Practitioners Act, that minority judgment of Fabiyi JSC, on a point not considered in the lead judgment, is not the judgment of the Court and it is at best an obiter dictum. See Abacha & Others v Fawehinmi[10] where the Supreme Court held as follows:

“The point of jurisprudential interest and of considerable interest in this appeal is the relationship of the bindingness of the ratio decidendi or rationes decidendi contained in the leading judgment on the one hand, and the other concurring judgments, on the other hand. Are they at par or are some superior to others? The jurisprudence and practice of law in this country appears to be tolerably clear: it is the ratio or the rationes contained in the leading judgment that constitutes or constitute the authority for which the case stands. All other expressions contained in the concurring judgments, particularly those not addressed in the leading judgment are obiter dictum or dicta.”

7. It is important to note that in Cole v Martins[11], the lower Court (the High Court in that instance) had itself held thus:

“The appeal notice and grounds were purported to be signed by a firm of solicitors known as Lardner and Company. Under the Legal Practitioners Act of 1962 Lardner and Company is not a legal practitioner and therefore there had been no compliance with Order 3 Rule 2 of the High Court of Lagos (Appeal Rules) and under Order 3 Rule 12 of the High Court of Lagos (Appeals Rules) the appeal shall stand dismissed.”

8. But the Supreme Court on Appeal, in Cole v Martin[12], refocused or reframed the question, not as postulated by the High Court as aforesaid, but as to, whether or not the person who signed using the business name in that case, H.A Lardner & Co, can actually be identified as a legal practitioner on the roll so as to be in compliance with the applicable rules of filing the Court process and the LPA.

9. In reaching its conclusion on that question after necessary inquiry, the Supreme Court then found that H.A Lardner & Co is the registered business name of H.A Lardner, who alone registered that name for his practice and thus, concluded that there has been sufficient compliance with the rules and the LPA in the following words:

“The notice filed here was on the prescribed form, but the name and address of the legal practitioner representing the appellant was given as ‘Lardner & Co. 22 Kakawa Street, Lagos’, and the notice was signed ‘Lardner & Co’…

The effect, however, of registering a business name under the Registration of Business Names Act, 1961, is that where only one person constitutes that business it is correct to describe that person as in the terms of the registered business name. In other words, Lardner & Co. here referred solely to Mr. H. A. Lardner. In determining the meaning to be given to the use of the term ‘legal practitioner’ in the Registration of Titles (Appeals) Rules it is necessary to bear in mind that Section 18 (1) of the Interpretation Act, 1964 gives ‘legal practitioner’ the meaning assigned to it by the Legal Practitioners’ Act 1962, namely ‘a person entitled in accordance with the provisions of this Act to practise as a barrister or as a barrister and solicitor, either generally or for the purpose of any particular office or proceedings’, but this is subject to the over-riding qualification of Section 1 of the Interpretation Act, 1964 that this meaning is to be applied unless there is a contrary intention appearing in the enactment in question. In our view having regard to the context of Rule 4 of the Registration of Titles (Appeals) Rules, the purpose of which on this issue, it seems to us, is to ensure that the name of the legal practitioner giving notice of appeal and representing the appellant is clearly known, then it is a sufficient compliance with the requirement for a legal practitioner to sign and give his name, if a legal practitioner practising alone gives the name under which he is registered as a business name, as this can only refer and apply to the legal practitioner who so holds himself out as practising under that business name. No possible doubt or confusion can therefore arise in these circumstances.”

10. Unfortunately, Onnoghen JSC in Okafor v Nweke[13] posed the very same question that the High Court had asked earlier in Cole v Martins, to wit, ‘whether J.H.C. OKOLO SAN & CO is a legal practitioner recognized by the law’ but which question, the Supreme Court in that case had rejected and reframed. We would argue that his lordship was so wrong in posing this same question as aforesaid.

11. Granted that Cole v Martins was not cited in Okafor v Nweke[14], but when it was cited in the latter case of SLB Consortium Ltd v NNPC, his Lordship Onnoghen JSC persisted in asking the same question, totally ignoring the purport and effect of the decision by the same Supreme Court on the very issue in Cole v Martins.

12. The real issue in all of these cases, as afore-stated, is whether or not the insertion under the signature of a business name in which the legal practitioner practises rather than the actual name of the legal practitioner so as to more easily identify the legal practitioner, was sufficient compliance with the requirement of the rules and the LPA?

13. In other words, by failing to put his actual name rather than his business name, did the process meet the requirement of the portion of the applicable rules requiring the process to be signed by a legal practitioner?

14. This clearly calls for an inquiry as to determine, as was done in Cole v Martins, whether or not the person who signed using a business name is not a legal practitioner practising in that business name by which he alone registered the same.

15. As it was H. A Lardner practicing as H. A Lardner & Co., as found in Cole v Martins, so it would have been found upon appropriate inquiry that it was J.H.C Okolo SAN practising as JHC Okolo SAN & Co. in Okafor v Nweke, more so, when the Apex Court recognised J.H.C Okolo SAN’s claim that he actually signed the processes in contention and the fact also, that the Reply Brief equally signed by him, carried his name, JHC Okolo SAN without the & Co. as Onnoghen JSC noted in the following words:

“It should however be mentioned that learned senior advocate for the applicants in filing a reply brief in reaction to the submission of his learned friend silk, signed the said reply brief in the proper way, as follows: J.H.C. OKOLO SAN J.H.C. OKOLO SAN & CO Applicants Counsel 162 Zik Avenue Uwani, Enugu.”

16. We submit that, having found that the processes were signed and presented by JHC OKOLO SAN (as the extract of his lordship’s judgement quoted above even more clearly demonstrates), why was the Supreme Court in any difficulty in accepting and holding that the other processes were signed by the learned Senior Counsel as he contended?

17. It was never in dispute that the name of the learned senior counsel JHC OKOLO SAN is on the roll. The Supreme Court ought properly, in the circumstances of the matter, to have accepted that JHC Okolo SAN signed the process and thus, put an end to the rather classically technical objection.

18. We will argue that, in not decisively doing so, the Apex Court inadvertently opened the door wide for other cases and created a monster.

19. However, in recent years, individual Justices of the Supreme Court began to question the rigid application of Okafor and sought to weaken its consequences. Justice Ejembi Eko delivered first a powerful dissenting judgment in Ajibode & Others v Gbadamosi & Others[15] in 2021, where faced with an objection based on Okafor and raised for the first time only at the Supreme Court, he insisted that any irregularities as regards the originating processes in the case raised a procedural jurisdictional matter which must be deemed to have been waived. He then characterized the majority view that entertained the objection and upheld it based on Okafor as constituting “crass technicality” that defeats substantial justice. Strong words no doubt,  but apparently dictated by his difficulty in understanding the rigidity of his lordship’s colleagues on the matter.  Then, in 2022, Justice Emmanuel Akomaye Agim delivered an even more comprehensive dissenting judgment in Network Securities Ltd v Dahiru & Ors[16] – a judgment that provided a complete roadmap for the Supreme Court to depart from Okafor and restore justice to this troubling area of Nigerian procedural law.

20. Remarkably, within six weeks of each other in 2025, the Supreme Court delivered two decisions that signal a significant judicial retreat from the rigid literalism of Okafor v Nweke , but still did not reverse Okafor. In Federal Housing Authority v Oyedeji & Ors[17] (11 April 2025), the Court clarified that the strict signing requirement applies only to originating processes proper – not to statements of claim – (a position which Ejembi Eko JSC (as he then was) had rightly rejected in his dissentient in Ajibode (Supra) as aforementioned by insisting that it applies to originating processes as well), and that procedural defects are waivable through participation without previous complaint or objections. In Olowe & Anor v Aluko[18] (23 May 2025), the Apex Court held that where the signatory is identifiable as a qualified legal practitioner, the statutory requirement is satisfied regardless of format. Together, these decisions substantially embrace the intellectual framework that Justice Agim in particular and Justice Ejembi Eko had articulated in their referenced dissents.

21. The referenced 2025 decisions demonstrate that the Supreme Court in its majority now understands what Justice Ejembi-Eko and Justice Agim fully understood in their most powerful dissents. The days of Okafor v Nweke’s unquestioned and seemingly unquestionable dominance appears gradually to be numbered.

22. Yet, the challenge is that there are still hundreds of cases, slowly grinding their way through our congested Court system, in which the Originating processes such as the writ of summons or Originating Summons etc were signed or executed like in Okafor. This is principally why the prevalence of Okafor, in spite of the 2025 decisions, remains most troubling.  Thus, the interest of Justice can only be best served if Okafor is completely departed from and decisively overruled.

23. With respect, the Kekere-Ekun-led Court has a judicial duty to confront and redress, at the earliest opportunity, the monumental injustices of Okafor and the havoc it has and continues to wreak. When that Court effectively reconsiders the case and overturns it, History will remember it and celebrate the decision as a classic example of a Court dutifully prepared to terminate the perpetuation of its most egregious error.

II. THE FACTUAL CONTEXT OF NETWORK SECURITIES V DAHIRU

24. The facts of Network Securities Ltd v Dahiru & Ors[19] coram Nweze, Augie, Ogunwumiju, Salauwa, Agim JJSC¹⁵ starkly illustrate the grave injustice and the human and economic cost of the Okafor doctrine. This was a land dispute that spanned a quarter-century, from 1996 to 2022. The plaintiff, Alhaji Umaru Dahiru, obtained a judgment at the trial court declaring that the revocation of his statutory right of occupancy was null and void. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. By the time the matter reached the Supreme Court, the plaintiff had been pursuing justice for 25 years, with concurrent favourable decisions from two lower courts.

25. At the Supreme Court, the appellant (Network Securities Ltd) raised a preliminary objection for the first time: that the originating processes had been signed by “A.A. Gulak and Company” – a law firm name – rather than by an identified individual lawyer. The appellant contended that this rendered all proceedings null and void ab initio, relying on Okafor v Nweke[20]. The majority of the Supreme Court upheld the objection and struck out all proceedings as a nullity.

26. Justice Emmanuel Akomaye Agim dissented. His Lordship began by pointedly framing the injustice before the Court:

“This Court is again faced with a situation where a plaintiff’s 25 year pursuit of justice with concurrent decisions of the two lower Courts in his favour declaring the revocation of his statutory right of occupancy illegal, is sought to be nullified by an objection raised for the first time in this Court on the sole ground that an unnamed legal practitioner in a firm of legal practitioners signed the application to issue the writ of summons. The appellant did not raise the objection in the lower Courts. If the objection is upheld it would frustrate the respondents’ 23 years quest for justice in the Courts and make a mockery of the Courts. I think this appeal should be dismissed.”

III. JUSTICE AGIM’S COMPREHENSIVE ROADMAP

27. Justice Agim’s dissent provided a comprehensive intellectual framework for departing from and overruling Okafor v Nweke[21]. His Lordship addressed the fundamental distinction between procedural and substantive jurisdiction in the circumstances thus:

“The failure to sign the writ of summons or endorse it as required is not a matter of jurisdiction but one of procedural requirement for the exercise of jurisdiction. It is a procedural defect which does not go to the root of the matter or deprive the court of jurisdiction. The High Court of the Federal Capital Territory has jurisdiction over land disputes in the Federal Capital Territory. The question is whether the procedural requirements for invoking that jurisdiction were satisfied. Even if they were not, such procedural defects can be waived where the party who could have objected participated fully in the proceedings without objection.”

28. His Lordship emphasised that the appellant had waived any irregularity by participating fully in proceedings at both lower courts without objection:

“….The appellant entered appearance and fully participated in the proceedings at the trial Court without raising any objection to the writ or its endorsement. The appellant also participated fully before the Court of Appeal and only raised this objection for the first time at this Court after concurrent findings against him at both lower Courts. This amounts to an approbation and reprobation which is not permissible. Having elected to participate in the proceedings without objection, the appellant cannot now be heard to complain about procedural irregularities. The law is well settled that procedural irregularities of this nature are subject to waiver…”

29. On the identification of the legal practitioner, Justice Agim demonstrated that no possible doubt or confusion could arise:

“..The writ was signed ‘A.A. Gulak and Company’. This clearly identifies A.A. Gulak as the legal practitioner. A.A. Gulak is a member of the Nigerian Bar whose name appears on the roll of legal practitioners. The firm name ‘A.A. Gulak and Company’ is registered under Section 573 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act as a business name under which A.A. Gulak practices. There can be no doubt or confusion as to the identity of the legal practitioner who signed the writ. The purpose of requiring a legal practitioner to sign court processes is to ensure accountability and that a qualified practitioner has prepared the document. Both purposes are fully satisfied here. No possible doubt or confusion can arise in these circumstances.”

30. Justice Agim cited with approval the binding precedent in Cole v Martins[22] which Okafor[23] had overlooked:

“The Supreme Court in that case held: ‘It is a sufficient compliance with the requirement for a legal practitioner to sign and give his name, if a legal practitioner practising alone gives the name under which he is registered as a business name, as this can only refer and apply to the legal practitioner who so holds himself out as practising under that business name. No possible doubt or confusion can therefore arise in these circumstances.’

That decision is directly on point and should have been followed. The decision in Okafor v Nweke[24] which reached the opposite conclusion made no reference to Cole v Martins[25] and appears to have been decided in ignorance of that binding precedent.”

31. Finally, Justice Agim invoked the principle that courts should correct errors:

“Where this Court has decided a matter in error, particularly where the error arose from deciding the case in ignorance of a binding precedent, it is the duty of this Court to correct that error. This Court in Veepee Industries Ltd v Cocoa Industries Ltd, (2008) 4-5 SC (Pt 1)16 held that it can depart from its previous decision if continuous adherence to it will occasion injustice on the grounds that it is better to admit an error than to persevere in error.”

IV. THE DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS: PROCEDURAL VERSUS SUBSTANTIVE JURISDICTION

32. Justice Agim’s analysis rested on the fundamental distinction between procedural and substantive jurisdiction – a distinction the Okafor majority had conflated. Substantive jurisdiction relates to a court’s fundamental authority to adjudicate a particular subject matter or category of dispute. This is conferred by the Constitution or enabling statutes and cannot be waived by the parties. Procedural jurisdiction, by contrast, concerns the manner in which a court exercises its substantive jurisdiction – the procedural steps and requirements that must be satisfied for the court properly to exercise the jurisdiction it undoubtedly possesses.

33. The foregoing distinction is well-established in Nigerian jurisprudence. In Anyankwoko v Okoye[26], the Supreme Court held that “procedural irregularities… do not affect the inherent jurisdiction of the court.” Similarly, in Famfa Oil Ltd v AG Federation[27], the Court distinguished between “jurisdiction in the strict sense” (substantive jurisdiction) and “procedural requirements for the exercise of jurisdiction,” noting that failure to comply with the latter which it indicated is a matter of “procedural jurisdiction” does not render proceedings a nullity if the defect is waived. In Saude v Abdullahi[28], the Court reiterated that procedural irregularities are amenable to waiver.

34. The principle that procedural irregularities must be raised timeously or be deemed waived is equally well-established. In Adegoke Motors Ltd v Adesanya[29], the Supreme Court held that where a defendant enters unconditional appearance without objecting to irregularities in the writ or its service, the defendant waives any right to challenge those irregularities on appeal. In Duke v Akpabuyo LG[30], the Court stated:

“If the party ‘sleeps’ on that right, and allows the proceedings to continue on the irregularity to finality… then the party cannot be heard to complain at the concluding or concluded stage of the proceedings or on appeal thereafter.”

35. Now, Justice Agim’s emphasis on this distinction exposed the fundamental error in Okafor v Nweke[31]. Okafor treated the signing irregularity as if it were a matter of substantive jurisdiction – as if the court lacked fundamental authority to hear the case at all. But this is manifestly wrong. The court possessed substantive jurisdiction over the subject matter. The alleged defect related solely to the procedural regularity of the originating process, which is a matter of procedural jurisdiction that can and should be regarded as waived where not timeously raised.

Justice Agim’s Profound and Sound Advice

36. Obviously constrained by the fact that he was the lone dissenting voice, Justice Agim in his dissentient now offered this advice as follows at page 27 of the Report:

“I think that we should depart from Okafor v Nweke (Supra) and similar decisions and return to Buhari v Yabo[32] because grave injustice will continue to result from following the judicial precedent in Okafor v Nweke and similar cases…….A situation where, a defendant whose concurrent decisions have been held not to have a defense to a Plaintiff’s claim, can use this kind of objection to nullify the proceedings and processes including the judgments against him after litigation that has lasted for many years, wreaks grave injustice on the Plaintiff and results in a complete destruction of his right of access to Court and right to have his claim determined within a reasonable time. In a case such as this one, where the legal practitioner adds ‘and company’ or the like to his name and is conducting the case, is it not glaring that he has held himself out as practicing under that name?”

37. The majority of the Court subsequently and regrettably ignored this most thoughtful advice.

V. JUSTICE EJEMBI EKO’S PARALLEL DISSENT

38. Justice Agim’s dissent did not emerge in a vacuum. It built upon the earlier reasoning of Justice Ejembi Eko, who had dissented in Ajibode & Others v Gbadamosi & Others[33] in 2021. In that case, the defendants had participated fully in proceedings at both the High Court and Court of Appeal without raising any objection that the writ was signed by “Toye Coker & Co.” rather than an individual legal practitioner. Only after losing at both lower courts did they appeal to the Supreme Court on this ground alone.

39. Justice Ejembi-Eko dissented powerfully. His Lordship held that the irregularity was one of procedural jurisdiction which could be and was waived:

“In the case of Noibi v Fikolati[34] it was held that where a party consented to wrong procedure at the trial Court and in fact suffered no injustice, it would be too late to complain on appeal that a wrong procedure was adopted. Thus, where an action was commenced by an irregular procedure and a defendant did not complain but took active part therein, he cannot later be heard to complain and take advantage of the irregularity.”

40. Justice Ejembi-Eko continued. His Lordship’s use of the phrase “crass technicality” signalled not merely disagreement with the majority’s reasoning, but a fundamental objection to the entire approach that privileges technical formalism over substantive justice.

“The Courts these days lean in favour of doing substantial justice in a case rather than hanging on crass technicality to re-open a procedural irregularity that had been waived by the party who could or should have timeously raised it.”

41. Justice Ejembi Eko also addressed the equitable dimensions:

“A defendant, who though aware of any defect in the writ of summons, still took steps in the proceedings is estopped from subsequently raising the issue of the defect. [I]t is inequitable for a defendant, who not objecting to a defective process, accepted it and acted on it; thus, leading the Plaintiff to believe that the defence had no objection hereto (as it does no harm to him), to subsequently raise it. The Court of justice will hold such conduct to be inequitable and unconscionable.”

42. Together, the dissentients of Justice Ejembi-Eko and Justice Agim constituted a powerful intellectual challenge to Okafor v Nweke[35]. They established three key principles: first, that the failure to properly sign court processes is fundamentally a matter of procedural jurisdiction which can be waived, not substantive jurisdiction which cannot; second, that courts should prioritise substantial justice rather than rigid adherence to technical irregularities; and third, that it offends equity for a defendant who participated in proceedings without objection at the lower courts to later challenge the process as defective at the Apex Court.

VI. THE 2025 SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL RETREAT

43. The intellectual framework articulated by Justice Agim and Justice Ejembi-Eko in their dissents has now happily been somewhat embraced by the two aforementioned Supreme Court decisions delivered within six weeks of each other in 2025. But these decisions having regard to their peculiar facts could not have confronted the decision in Okafor[36] which was based on a different set of facts even though some part of the reasoning in Okafor was seemingly impliedly challenged therein.

44. Importantly, however, and having regard to the foregoing, neither decision, in fairness, could have overruled or reversed Okafor there being no basis to do so and there was indeed, understandably no attempt to do so. Okafor thus remains intact as a questionable precedent, but only because previous decisions of the Apex Court have continued to rely on it, and treated it, as such.

A. Federal Housing Authority v Oyedeji & Ors (April 2025)

45. In Federal Housing Authority v Mr. Emmanuel Oyedeji & Ors, (2025) LPELR – 81104(SC) coram Abba Aji, Salauwa, Agim, Nwosu-Iheme, Adah JJSC, decided on 11 April 2025, the appellant raised an Okafor v Nweke-type objection: that the Statement of Claim had been signed by “Dele Falana & Co.” rather than by an individual legal practitioner. The Supreme Court coram unanimously rejected this challenge through a dual doctrinal approach.

46. First, the Court emphatically clarified that the Statement of Claim, which was objected to here, is NOT an originating process at all, contrary to the contention of the Objector. Justice Chioma Egondu Nwosu-Iheme JSC, delivering the lead judgment, held:

“One of the critical issues raised in the appeal Ed had to do with the jurisdiction of the trial Court and ipso facto, the jurisdiction of the lower Court. The issues of jurisdiction are firstly that the Originating Process was signed by a law firm and that it being an Originating Process, the suit was not competent. The so-called Originating Process was the Statement of Claim filed by Dele Falana & Co. It is clearly stated under the rules of the trial Court that civil suits can only be instituted by: (a) Writ of Summons (b) Originating Summons (c) Originating Motions or (d) Petition or by any other method required by other rules of Court governing a particular subject matter. The instant case is a simple civil action and not among the specialized matters under the special jurisdiction of the trial Court. There is nowhere in our procedural laws that a Statement of Claim is taken as an Originating Process. A Statement of Claim is the pleading of the claimant or plaintiff detailing the facts of his case. It is not used to originate matters in the trial Court.”

47. Second, and critically, the Court held that even if there were an irregularity in the signing of the Statement of Claim, it had been waived by the appellant’s full participation in proceedings. Justice Nwosu-Iheme JSC, citing the earlier decision in Heritage Bank Ltd v Bentworth Fin. (Nig.) Ltd[37], stated:

“The originating process to which all other processes were attached was signed by Dele Falana Esq., and the signatures appearing on all the other documents, even though presented as Dele Falana & Co were signed with the same signature identical to that affixed to Dele Falana Esq. I do not think this discrepancy is material enough to vitiate the Writ of Summons on which the suit was grounded. I also agree that Dele Falana, Esq., is a registered legal practitioner whose name is on the roll of the Supreme Court and is entitled to practice as such under the Legal Practitioners Act, LFN, 2004 and his identity as the person who signed the writ of summons, the statement of claim and particulars of claim is not in doubt.”

48. The Court then quoted with approval the reasoning of Justice Ejembi-Eko in Heritage Bank[38]:

“The facts of this case, particularly on this objection, are that in spite of the fact that the statement of claim was allegedly not signed by a known legally qualified Legal Practitioner, but by a firm of Legal Practitioners, the appellant, as the defendant, condoned the defective process. They participated in the proceedings and evidence arising from the statement of claim was called after the statement of defence joining issues with the defective statement of claim was filed. Judgment of the trial Court, based on the evidence elicited from the statement of claim, was delivered without objection. Even at the Court of Appeal no issue was made of the alleged defective statement of claim. The appellant, as the defendant, had clearly condoned the defective statement of claim and waived his right to object to this defective process.”

49. Justice Stephen Jonah Adah JSC, in his concurring judgment, reinforced the waiver principle:

“A Statement of Claim is the pleading of the claimant or plaintiff detailing the facts of his case. It is not used to originate matters in the trial Court. It is however, fundamental that a proper Statement of Claim be filed in any case to give the Defendants opportunity of knowing the extent of the claim of the plaintiff. Where an incompetent Statement of Claim is filed, it is the duty of the Defendant to promptly raise the issue protesting it. If the Defendant does not object to it, and he reacts to it by filing his own statement of defence and the case goes into trial, he has waived his right of objection and cannot at the conclusion of the case start raising it on appeal.”

50. Justice Uwani Musa Abba Aji JSC was characteristically direct: “This appeal is a vexation to this Court. Appeal dismissed.” Clearly, the unanimity of the panel – all five Justices agreeing – demonstrates quite a strong judicial institutional support for the principle of waiver.

51. But, it must however be appreciated here that this decision, on the facts, was in respect of and limited to a Statement of Claim and not an originating process, which process in this case having been signed by Dele Falana ESQ was not objected to, as it could not have been. So, in the circumstances of this case, the facts are different from those in Okafor v Nweke[39] which involved an objection as to the signing of the writ of summons in the name JHC OKOLO SAN & Co. It also did not raise the question of whether signing in that manner was proper and not void as held in Okafor[40].

B. Olowe & Anor v Aluko[41] (May 2025)

52. Six weeks later, in Olowe & Anor v Aluko[42], decided on 23 May 2025, the Supreme Court addressed yet another case on this signature challenge more direct Okafor v Nweke-type challenge. This case involved a 70-year land dispute that had traversed the Nigerian court system since 1950. The appellants argued that the Statement of Claim, signed by “Akeredolu and Olujimi,” was invalid under Okafor because it was signed by a firm rather than an individual practitioner.

53. The Supreme Court coram rejected this challenge and the reasoning of Justice Mohammed Baba Idris JSC, delivering the lead judgment, where he articulated the legislative purpose underlying the signature requirement bears reproduction thus:

“The essence of the Legal Practitioners Act, originally enacted in 1962, is to regulate the legal profession in Nigeria by ensuring that only qualified persons who have been duly called to the Nigerian Bar and whose names are inscribed on the Roll of Legal Practitioners are permitted to engage in legal practice. The legislative intention behind the Act is to curb the unauthorized and unqualified practice of law by individuals who have not undergone the prescribed legal training, including attendance at the Nigerian Law School and successful completion of the Bar Final Examinations. Consequently, once the name of a person is identifiable as a legal practitioner, the requirements of Section 2(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act are deemed to have been satisfied.”

54. His Lordship then applied this interpretation to the facts:

“The Writ of Summons in this suit was signed by Akin Olujimi, Esq., while the accompanying Statement of Claim bears the signatures of Akeredolu and Olujimi. Both individuals are not only undisputedly legal practitioners but are also enrolled to practice law within the jurisdiction of Nigeria. In the light of the foregoing, the signing of the Statement of Claim cannot be deemed as defective. The names of the signatories are clearly identifiable as belonging to persons duly qualified and entitled to practice law under the provisions of the Legal Practitioners Act. There is no uncertainty or ambiguity as to their professional standing, and their endorsement on the originating processes sufficiently satisfies the statutory requirement for proper signing by a legal practitioner. Once a name appearing on a legal process is identifiable as that of a person duly enrolled as a legal practitioner in Nigeria, the requirements of the Legal Practitioners Act are deemed to have been complied with and such process is valid in the eyes of the law.”

55. Justice Habeeb Adewale Olumuyiwa Abiru JSC, in his concurring judgment, rightly provided an extensive exposition of the purposive approach to statutory interpretation:

“It is elementary that the objective of the interpretation of the provisions of a statute is to discover the intention of the legislature in making the statute; the purpose the legislature intended to achieve by the provisions of the statute… The Court must guide itself with the essence of a provision in giving meaning to words of that provision. Courts must interpret statutes by implication to give effect to the true intention of the law makers… This is the cornerstone of the purposive and creative approach to the interpretation of statutes, sometimes referred to as purposivism or the modern principle of construction. The purposive approach is an approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation under which common law Courts interpret an enactment in the light of the purpose for which it was enacted or within the context of the law’s purpose… It involves the consideration of three factors: the language of the provision, the context in which the language is used and the purpose of the legislation. Once an interpretation meets the purpose of the provision of an enactment, then it is fine, and it is irrelevant that other possible interpretations of the provision exist.”

56. Justice Abiru then applied this framework directly to the signature requirement:

“In other words, the key point is that in considering whether or not a Court process was properly signed and endorsed, the Courts should be guided by the essence and purpose of the requirement of such signing as signaled in the provisions of Sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act, and as interpreted by this Court. Once the signing of a Court process comes within the threshold of the essence and purpose of the provisions, then, it is proper. In the instant case, it is not the case of the Appellants that either Mr. Akeredolu or Mr. Olujinmi, in whose names the statement of claim was signed, was a person whose name is not on the Roll of Barristers and Solicitors in Nigeria. In fact, the two gentlemen went on from this case to distinguish themselves as practicing lawyers at the Bar and were both conferred with the rank of Senior Advocate of Nigeria. There is nothing on the statement of claim suggesting that it was signed in the name of a law firm. The way and manner of the signing of the statement of claim thus met the essence and purpose of the provisions of Sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act, as interpreted by this Court. The signing of the statement of claim was thus proper and regular.”

57. Again, it should be borne in mind that here unlike in Okafor, the writ of summons was not the subject of the objection as it was signed by Akin Olujimi as noted in the judgment, but the Statement of Claim. But even then, the manner of signing “Akeredolu & Olujimi” is not only different from how it was done in Okafor to wit “JHC OKOLO SAN & Co” but that they are two distinct and readily identifiable names as his lordship noted.

VII. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT: RETREAT, NOT REVERSAL

58. These foregoing 2025 decisions of the Apex Court appear to weaken in a sense a part of the fundamental reasoning in Okafor and represent a significant and welcome retreat. Together, FHA v Oyedeji[43] and Olowe v Aluko[44] create a two-pronged important judicial retreat: the first narrows the scope of Okafor[45] (applying only to true originating processes), while the second softens its standard (identifiability, not strict format, is the test). Therefore, in our well-considered view, a litigant facing an Okafor-type challenge now may possibly raise multiple defences: “This document is not an originating process”; “Even if it is, the signatory is identifiable.”

59. However, the latter possible defense is not without its challenge as none of these two recent cases involved an Originating process or was executed in the manner of the facts in Okafor namely in such a manner as like JHC OKOLO SAN & CO. The law is that a case is only authority for what it decided and that it is the facts of a case that determine and guide the application of the law.

60. No one put it better than Oputa JSC in the often-cited case of Adegoke Motors v Adesanya[46] (Supra) where the eminent Justice delivering the lead judgment, put the position of the law succinctly thus:

“From the arguments put forward both in the briefs and oral submissions of the parties, it is evident that the parties interpreted our various decisions where Sections 97, 98 and 99 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act were mentioned: especially Sken Consult (Nig) Ltd and amor v Ukey (1981) 1 SC 6 and Ezomo v Oyakhire (1985) 2 S.C 260; (1985) 1 N.W.L.R (Part 2) 195 differently and arrived at different conclusions as to what exactly this Court decided in those cases. It also appeared in rather bold relief that there is now a tendency among our last, and sometimes among some of our judges, to consider pronouncements made by Justices of the Supreme Court in unnecessary isolation from the facts and surrounding circumstances of those particular cases in which those pronouncements were made. I think it ought to be obvious by now, that it is the facts and circumstances of any given case that frame the issues for decision in that particular case. Pronouncements of our justices whether rationes decidendi or obiter dicta must therefore be inextricably and intimately related to the facts of the given case. Citing those pronouncements without relating them to the facts that induced them will be citing them out of their proper context, for without known facts, it is impossible to know the law on those facts. The facts and circumstances of the recent case of Ben Obi Nwabuy & anor v Justice Obi Okoye (1988) 4 N.W.L.R (part (91) 664 and the decision and pronouncements of this Court in that case, all too clearly illustrate the point here being made- that Court’s decisions and pronouncements derive their strength, their persuasive potency, their inspiration and therefore their value as precedent from the facts of the case as pleaded and presented.”

61. So, it must be here. The pronouncements of the Justices in the two cases must be tied to the facts of the cases as aforementioned. Consequently, in spite of the pronouncements in the two cases, the core decision in Okafor remains unaffected, that an Originating Process signed as “JHC OKOLO & CO” or similarly is fundamentally defective, null and void and robs the Court of Jurisdiction to entertain the entire proceedings even if the objection was only raised at the Apex Court.

62. It must however be pointed out, nonetheless and to their credit, that the two decisions appear to substantially embrace some of the intellectual framework that Justice Agim articulated in his Network Securities dissent. The distinction between procedural and substantive jurisdiction, the waiver principle, the focus on identifiability rather than strict format, the emphasis on substance over form – all of these elements, present in Justice Agim’s dissent, now find some expression in majority holdings. The roadmap laid out by Justice Agim now appears to be gradually getting to the center stage.

Recognising What the 2025 Decisions Have Not Done

63. However, it is essential to recognise what the 2025 decisions have not done. First, and most critically, neither case has attempted to reverse let alone overrule Okafor v Nweke[47]. Justice Abiru in Olowe even cited Okafor and its progeny with approval before pivoting to the purposive approach. This means Okafor remains ‘good’ law. Future litigants whose lawyers signed Originating processes in the manner, similar to what happened in Okafor would still fall victim to the strict rule. In effect, the ghost of Okafor may have been arguably somewhat weakened, but CERTAINLY not exorcised in any way. The injustices of Okafor continue to be perpetrated.

64. Second, and equally fundamentally, these decisions cannot undo the injustice inflicted on litigants whose cases, based on Okafor were struck out at all levels of Courts between 2007 and 2025 and are still presently being struck out. The countless litigants who had meritorious claims nullified under Okafor – some irredeemably shut out by limitation periods from ever again having their days in Court on the matter, others having suffered irreversible property losses – cannot and do not benefit from the 2025 retreat. For them, the purposive interpretation comes too late. This includes the respondent in Network Securities itself, whose 25-year quest for justice was frustrated by the majority that rejected Justice Agim’s remarkably powerful dissent.

65. Third, the reasoning in Olowe seemingly contains an element of arbitrariness. Justice Abiru noted that “the two gentlemen went on from this case to distinguish themselves as practicing lawyers at the Bar and were both conferred with the rank of Senior Advocate of Nigeria.” But this retrospective validation based on subsequent prominence offers,  but little ,  relief to majority of litigants whose lawyers are relatively not that well known or prominent and or remain obscure. The identifiability test should not depend on whether the lawyer later became a SAN but should apply without discrimination across board.

66. Fourth, and most significantly, neither the 2025 decisions nor Justice Agim’s dissent address the fundamental anachronism underlying the entire debate. As at 2025, the Nigerian Bar Association now maintains a digital Roll accessible online. Every lawyer has a unique seal number. Verification of a lawyer’s enrolment status takes seconds, not litigation. The original purpose of the signature requirement – preventing unqualified persons from practising law – is now achievable instantly through digital verification.  Indeed, the purpose of the signature requirement in 1962 cannot be justified in this 2025 of ICT where the identity of lawyers can be verified on the spot.

67. The 2025 decisions represent judicial patch-work – creative interpretation which may mitigate the harshest consequences of Okafor. But they do not address the root problem: the Legal Practitioners Act (Cap L11, LFN 2004) should have   been amended to reflect modern realities. What is needed is legislative reform: either abolish the signature requirement entirely (since verification is now electronic) or replace it with digital verification protocols. Until then, the judiciary will continue improvising solutions to a problem that could as well be resolved promptly by the legislature. There is now hope with the on-going consideration of a welcome Executive Bill to amend finally the Legal Practitioners Act which hopefully will deal effectively with the problem.

VIII. CONCLUSION: A WEAKENING GHOST

68.  The earlier work examining Justice Ejembi-Eko’s dissents was titled: “Has a Daniel Come to Judgment?” The biblical reference was to the young Daniel’s wisdom in exposing false testimony and ensuring justice. We asked whether Justice Ejembi-Eko’s powerful dissents marked the beginning of a judicial shift away from the rigid formalism of Okafor v Nweke[48] toward a more just approach.

69. With Justice Agim’s comprehensive dissent in Network Securities providing the roadmap, and with the 2025 decisions in FHA v Oyedeji[49] and Olowe v Aluko[50] moving in the direction of that roadmap, we can now contend that, we hope that the judicial tide has turned. The Supreme Court in its majority and for the first time, has now embraced, in a meaningful way, some of the principles articulated in the dissents of Justices Ejembi Eko and Agim. The ghost of Okafor is weakening.

70. However, we must be measured in our assessment. The ghost has been weakened, not exorcised. Okafor v Nweke[51] has not been overruled. It still remains technically good law, even though it was reached per incuriam and it remains available for invocation and application by any future panel in circumstances where the 2025 escape routes do not apply. A litigant whose lawyer signs an originating process, in a way or manner, like in Okafor, would still find himself or itself at the mercy of Okafor’s rigid formalism notwithstanding that the objection is only raised for the first time at the Supreme Court.

71. What the referenced 2025 decisions of the Supreme Court have achieved and to a limited extent is to provide robust defences against some fall outs of Okafor: the ambush objections raised for the first time at the Supreme Court after full participation below, the technical challenges to statements of claim rather than true originating processes, the rigid formalism that ignores readily identifiable practitioners. These defences – scope limitation, waiver, and purposive interpretation – will relievingly protect many litigants. But they will not protect all especially as they still do not apply to Originating processes.

72. The work, therefore, remains incomplete. Until Okafor is overruled – preferably by a Full Court that finally acknowledges its per incuriam status and preserves the legal regime of Cole v Martins[52], in Justice Agim’s words – uncertainty will persist. The protection of the constitutional right to fair hearing within a reasonable time demands no less.

73. Nevertheless, the trajectory is clear. The intellectual framework articulated by Justices Ejembi Eko and Agim – the procedural/substantive jurisdiction distinction, the waiver principle, the focus on identifiability – now seems to have been embraced by the majority on the Court.

74. The latest 2025 decisions demonstrate that the Supreme Court in its majority now understands what Justice Ejembi-Eko and Justice Agim fully understood in their most powerful dissents. The days of Okafor v Nweke’s unquestioned and seemingly unquestionable dominance appears gradually to be numbered.

75. Yet, the challenge is that there are still hundreds of cases, if not a few thousands, slowly grinding their way through our congested Court system, to the Apex Court, in which the Originating processes such as the writ of summons or Originating Summons etc were signed or executed like in Okafor.

76. This is principally why the prevalence of Okafor, in spite of the 2025 decisions, remains most troubling. We would argue that the interest of Justice can only be best served if Okafor is completely departed from and decisively overruled.

77. In conclusion, we would contend with respect that the Kekere-Ekun-led Court has a judicial duty to confront and redress, at the earliest opportunity, the monumental injustices of Okafor and the havoc it has and continues to wreak. When it explicitly overrules Okafor as the Justice of the matter requires, History will remember it and celebrate the decision as a classic example of a Court remarkably and appropriately willing, as it should justly do, to terminate the perpetuation of its most egregious error.

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References

[1] (2007) 1 NWLR (Pt 1014) 248.

[2] (2021) LPELR-55283(SC)

[3] (2022) LPELR-57835(SC)

[4] (2025) LPELR-81104(SC).

[5] (2025) LPELR-81320(SC)

[6] (1968) 1 All NLR 14

[7] (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt 1329) 1

[8] Kola’ Awodein SAN & Seyi Sowemimo SAN, “Justice Ejembi Eko on Improperly Signed Court Processes in Heritage Bank Ltd v Bentworth Fin. (Nig.) Ltd and Ajibode & Others v Gbadamosi & Others – Has a Daniel Come to Judgement?” (LawPavilion, 2021)

[9] (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt 1259) 394

[10] (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt 660) 228

[11] Ibid

[12] (1968), supra, n.6

[13] ibid, at 28-29.

[14] Okafor v Nweke (2007), supra, n.1

[15] Ajibode & Others v Gbadamosi & Others (2021), supra, n.2

[16] Network Securities Ltd v Dahiru & Ors (2022), supra, n.3

[17] Federal Housing Authority v Mr. Emmanuel Oyedeji & Ors (2025), supra, n.4

[18] Olowe & Anor v Aluko (2025), supra, n.6

[19][19] Network Securities Ltd v Dahiru & Ors (2022), supra, n. 3

[20] Ibid

[21] Ibid

[22] Ibid

[23] Ibid

[24] Ibid

[25] Ibid

[26] (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt 1270) 335

[27] (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt 822) 461

[28] (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt 116) 387

[29] (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt 109) 250

[30] (2007) All FWLR (Pt 365) 1680 at 1696

[31] Ibid

[32] (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt 975) 152

[33] (2021), supra, n.2

[34] (1961) 1 All NLR 241

[35] Ibid

[36] Ibid

[37] (2020) LPELR-50840(SC)

[38] Ibid

[39] Ibid

[40] Ibid

[41] (2025), supra, n.5

[42] Ibid

[43] ibid

[44] Ibid

[45] Ibid

[46] Adegoke Motors Ltd v Adesanya (1989), supra, n. 29

[47] Supra

[48] Ibid

[49] Supra

[50] Supra

[51] Supra

[52] Supra