Are TSA Funds Immune From Garnishee Attachment?

CASE TITLE:  CBN V. OKORIE & ORS

JUDGMENT DATE:   24TH DECEMBER, 2025

JUSTICES:  OYEBISI FOLAYEMI OMOLEYE, J.C.A.

JUDGE’S NAME MOHAMMED LAWAL ABUBAKAR, J.C.A.

JUDGE’S NAME NTONG FESTUS NTONG, J.C.A.

DIVISION: OWERRI

PRACTICE AREA:  PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

FACTS:

This appeal borders on Garnishee Proceedings.

This appeal is against the decision of the Federal High Court, Umuahia Division, coram D. E. Osiagor, J., delivered on the 21st day of January, 2021.

The 1st Respondent earlier instituted an action at the Federal High Court, Umuahia Division, for the enforcement of her fundamental rights against the 4th-6th Respondents. The trial Court entered judgment in her favour, awarding ₦6,031,030.00 as compensation for the violation of her rights. An appeal lodged by the 6th Respondent on behalf of the judgment debtors to the Court of Appeal, Owerri Division, was dismissed, and the judgment of the Federal High Court was affirmed, with costs of ₦50,000.00 awarded against the 6th Respondent.

Upon the continued failure of the judgment debtors to satisfy the judgment sum, the 1st Respondent initiated garnishee proceedings at the Federal High Court, Umuahia, to enforce the judgment. A Garnishee Order Nisi was granted against the Appellant and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as garnishees in respect of funds allegedly held by them for the judgment debtors.

The Appellant filed an affidavit to show cause and raised a preliminary objection contending that the garnishee proceedings were incompetent for failure to obtain the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation as required under Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. In a ruling delivered on 21 January 2021, the trial Court dismissed the objection, made the Garnishee Order Nisi absolute against the Appellant, and discharged the 2nd and 3rd Respondents.

Being dissatisfied with the decision of the trial Court making the order absolute, the Appellant filed this appeal.

ISSUES:

The Court determined the appeal on the following issues:

1. Whether the Learned Trial Judge had jurisdiction to hear and determine the Garnishee matter against the Appellant a Public Officer of the Federation, when the 1st Respondent did not obtain the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation before commencing the garnishee process as provided by Section 84 of Sheriffs and Civil Processes Act?

2. Whether the Learned Trial Judge was right in law when he made the Garnishee Order Absolute against the Appellant’s Treasury Single Account, which is the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federal Government of Nigeria that is not attachable by Garnishee thereby, made an Order contrary to Section 84(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended?

COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS:

Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act provides for the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation where money sought to be attached is in the custody of a public officer. He argued that the Appellant, the Central Bank of Nigeria, whom the 1st Respondent alleged to be holding money belonging to the 3rd, 4th and 5th Respondents, is a public officer within the meaning of that provision. On this point of law, he relied on the decisions in CBN v. Hydro Air Pty Ltd. (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1434) 482 at 526, and CBN v. Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (2017) All FWLR (Pt. 900) 422 at 448–449.

He further cited the case of Attorney-General of Rivers State v. Attorney-General of Bayelsa State & Anor. (2012) LPELR-9336 (SC), where the Supreme Court, relying on Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, held that the term public officer extends to artificial persons. Learned counsel also referred to the case of CBN v. Alhaji Mohammed Kakar (2016) LPELR-41468 (CA) where the Court of Appeal held that the Central Bank of Nigeria is indeed a public officer as contemplated under Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.

Having established that the Appellant is a public officer, learned counsel contended that the learned trial Judge acted without jurisdiction when he made the Garnishee Order Nisi and subsequently the Garnishee Order Absolute against the Appellant without the 1st Respondent first obtaining the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation, contrary to the clear provision of Section 84(1) of the Act.

He maintained that once a process of Court is incompetent, as in the present appeal where the Garnishee Orders were obtained without such consent, the entire proceedings become void for want of jurisdiction. It was his submission that the failure to obtain the Federal Attorney-General’s consent vitiated the jurisdiction of the trial Court “ab initio”. In support of this proposition, learned counsel relied on the cases of Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 NSCC 374 at 380 and SLB Consortium v. N.N.P.C. (2011) 5 SCNJ 211 at 224. On the basis of these authorities, he urged this Court to resolve Issue One in favour of the Appellant.

Learned counsel for the 1st Respondent submitted that it is well settled that the power of the Court to enforce its own judgments is the fulcrum upon which it proceeds to adjudicate over matter “ab initio”, since judgments of the Courts must be enforced as the Courts do not act in vain. He argued that the sacrosanct power of Courts to enforce their judgments and orders is inherent in the judicial powers vested in them by Section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

He further contended that the requirement for the consent of the Federal Attorney General must not be viewed in isolation of the constitutional powers of the Courts to enforce their judgments and orders. According to learned counsel, the said consent is not intended to serve as a clog in the exercise of the Courts’ constitutional powers.

It was further submitted that there is the need to distinguish between situations in law where the consent of the Federal Attorney General was not sought at all and those where consent was sought but neither granted nor refused. He posited that in circumstances such as the present case, where the 1st Respondent/Judgment Creditor sought the consent of the Federal Attorney General but the consent was not expressly refused, the Court is entitled to proceed to grant a garnishee order nisi and accordingly make it absolute.

Learned counsel referred to the record of appeal at pages 55 to 57 to show that the 1st Respondent/Judgment Creditor had indeed applied to the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation for consent before applying for the order nisi. The Federal Attorney General, upon receipt of the application, requested to be furnished with the particulars of the judgment sought to be enforced. The Judgment Creditor therefore furnished him with copies of the judgments of the Federal High Court and the Court of Appeal which affirmed the former, by a letter dated 26th April 2019. Counsel noted that thereafter, the Federal Attorney General maintained silence on the application.

He submitted that these facts and correspondence between the 1st Respondent and the Federal Attorney General were duly averred and exhibited in the affidavit in support of the garnishee application as well as in the further affidavit in reply to the Garnishee’s affidavit to show cause. Hence, the trial Court rightly granted the orders sought.

The learned counsel then raised the question: whether the silence of the Federal Attorney General, after being duly notified of the judgments and the intention to garnishee the funds, amounted to a refusal of consent? He urged this Court to resolve the question in the negative.

He argued, first, that the rationale for securing the Federal Attorney General’s consent under Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (SCPA) is to prevent the embarrassment of diverting public funds earmarked for specific purposes to satisfy a judgment debt unknown to the government. Relying on the cases of Christopher Onjewu v. Kogi State Ministry of Commerce & Industry [2003] 10 NWLR (Pt. 827) 40 at 89, learned counsel submitted that in the instant case, the Federal Attorney General was duly informed of the relevant judgments and the intention to enforce the same. Having studied the judgments and chosen to remain silent, he is deemed to have acquiesced. Counsel contended that if the funds had been earmarked for any specific governmental purpose, the Federal Attorney General would have expressly refused consent and given reasons for such refusal.

It was further contended that while Section 84 of the SCPA gives the Federal Attorney General some discretion, silence as in the instant case or unjustified refusal to grant consent is inconsistent with Section 287(3) of the Constitution, which mandates all authorities and persons to obey and enforce the decisions of Courts. He argued that to interpret Section 84 as giving the Federal Attorney General unfettered power to stall enforcement would render the Courts impotent, contrary to the settled legal principle that, as Courts do not act in vain, decisions and orders of Courts of competent jurisdiction must be obeyed and duly enforced. He relied in this wise on the case of  Muhammad Ibrahim v. Olatunji Ogunleye [2012] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1282) 489.

Learned counsel also referred to the case of Jo Anakwemze v. Louis Aneke [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 771 at 779 and submitted that consent under Section 84 of the SCPA need not be express in every instance. He cited the case of CBN v. Interstella Communications Ltd (2017) LPELR-43940 (SC), where the Supreme Court held that there are instances in which the Attorney General’s consent may be implied from the circumstances of the case. He urged their Lordships to adopt that interpretation and hold that in the present case, the Federal Attorney General’s silence amounted to implied consent.

Furthermore, learned counsel argued that under the general law of correspondence, failure to respond to a formal communication amount to confirmation and admission. He relied in this wise on the cases of Arocom Global Investments Ltd v. United Parcel Services Ltd (2021) LPELR-52891 (CA); Advanced Technologies Nig. Ltd v. Express International Plant Hire Nig. Ltd (2019) LPELR-47833 (CA); and UBA Plc v. Vertex Agro Ltd (2019) LPELR-48743 (CA). He submitted that the Federal Attorney General’s silence in the instant case, in law, constitutes affirmation of consent. He further referred to the cases of Nagebu & Co. Nig. Ltd v. Unity Bank Plc (2014) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1405) 42 at 81; Karimet Global Trade Links Ltd v. Unity Bank Plc (2014) LPELR-23986 (CA); and Intime Connection Ltd v. Ichie (2009) LPELR-8772 (CA), and contended that in the absence of an express refusal, silence amounts to confirmation and admission.

In conclusion, learned counsel urged this Court to find and hold that the silence of the Attorney General of the Federation on the application for consent amounted to implied consent, and that the learned trial Court was right in proceeding to make the garnishee order nisi absolute in the circumstances. He accordingly urged this Court to resolve this issue against the Appellant and in favour of the 1st Respondent.

DECISION/HELD:

The appeal was dismissed.

RATIO:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE- GARNISHEE PROCEEDINGS: Whether funds standing to the credit of a government agency in the Treasury Single Account are immune from garnishee attachment

“The constitutional argument of the Appellant regarding the provisions of Section 80(2) and (4) of the Constitution is misplaced. The said provisions regulate withdrawals from the Consolidated Revenue Fund but do not confer immunity from judicial enforcement of valid judgments. Once funds are appropriated to a ministry or agency, they assume the character of operational funds. The CBN, as bankers to government and its agencies, cannot simultaneously assert custody and claim immunity from disclosure. The evidence permits the inference that the sums are operational receipts of the Immigration Service preserved in the TSA and therefore attachable. No contrary evidence was produced showing that the sums remained part of the unappropriated Consolidated Revenue Fund.

Precedents such as CBN v. Interstellar Communications Ltd. (2017) LPELR-43940(SC) and CBN v. Chief Ubana (2016) NGCA 59 confirm that funds held by government agencies through the TSA are not immune from garnishee attachment, and that the duty of full disclosure is judicial, not discretionary.

Where the judgment debtor is a government office or agency, liability is official, and the garnishee order properly reaches funds “accruing to” that office. The Appellant’s reliance on formal non-possession without evidence is at best evasive and does not rebut the presumption of custody. The trial Court was entitled to infer that, had genuine evidence of non-custody or constitutional immunity existed, details in that regard could have been produced by the Appellant.” Per OMOLEYE, J.C.A.

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