“It is also true that this Court can do inestimable good through its wise decisions. Similarly, the Court can do incalculable harm through its mistakes. When therefore it appears to learned counsel that any decision of this Court has been given per incuriam, such counsel should have the boldness and courage to ask that such a decision be overruled.” – Oputa. J.S.C. (Adegoke Motors Ltd v. Adesanya [1989])
I. Abstract
In criticising the judgments and decisions of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in recent times, academics, practicing lawyers, writers, law reporters, public intellectuals and others often lament what they commonly refer to as conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court and advocate an urgent arrest of the situation by the Court – though without meaningfully offering how to achieve this feat.
This article proposes to interrogate this notion of “conflicting decisions” of the Apex Court and argues that it is often mischaracterised and unreal. Our analysis demonstrates that while some decisions commonly labelled as “conflicting” are, for the most part, in fact, decisions made per incuriam, having failed to consider binding precedents, others reflect more complex jurisprudential challenges – such as rapid shifts in position by different panels of the Court and sharp judicial divisions on fundamental issues. This complexity has been further complicated by the Court’s recent attempt to justify departures from precedent through the concept of “implied overruling” – a concerning development that threatens to institutionalise rather than resolve these jurisprudential challenges. Moreover, this article proposes to do far more than simply criticise albeit constructively, it deliberately sets out to offer workable and pragmatic solution to what has become a crisis.
According to Black’s Law Dictionary (2023), Per Incuriam means through inadvertence – something done in error with oversight and without considering all the relevant factors. Within the common law system of judicial precedent, the doctrine specifically refers to a judgment decided without reference to, or in ignorance of, a statute or an earlier judgment which would have been relevant and therefore affected the result of the case.
In Alhaji Karimu Adisa v. Emmanuel Oyinwola & Ors (2000), the Supreme Court of Nigeria, per Ogundare JSC, clearly stated when a case can be deemed to have been decided per incuriam. Citing Karibi-Whyte JSC with approval, the Court held that ‘a case is decided per incuriam where, a statute or rule having statutory effect or other binding authority, which would have affected the decision, had not been brought to the attention of the Court.’ The Court further adopted the view expressed in ‘Cross on Precedent in English Law’ (1961) that ‘The principle appears to be that a decision can only be said to be per incuriam if it is possible to point to a step in the reasoning and show that it was faulty because of a failure to mention a statute, a rule having statutory effect or an authoritative case which might have made the decision different from what it was.’
The approach of the Supreme Court to identifying and addressing her own per incuriam decisions was clearly articulated in Okonkwo Ngwo & Ors v Raphael Monye & Others (1970). Coker JSC succinctly stated that ‘when a decision is impugned on the ground that it has been arrived by the Court only because the Court has acted in ignorance or concealment of an authority, statutory or otherwise, which is binding on the Court, the decision is said to have been given per incuriam and constitutes a special case where the Court is not bound to apply the case on the principle of stare decisis.’ His Lordship emphasised that where a decision is given per incuriam, ‘it does not possess for this Court any binding effect and this Court is entitled to disregard it.’ Drawing from English authorities, his Lordship referenced Lord Goddard’s position in Nicholas v Penny (1950) that ‘where material cases or statutory provisions, which show that a Court had decided a case wrongly were not brought to its attention the Court is not bound by that decision in a subsequent case.’
To be clear, the Supreme Court of Nigeria, as established in Abdulkarim v. Incar Nigeria Ltd (1992)and numerous subsequent decisions, possesses the inherent power to depart from its own precedents. As the court of last resort, while it generally respects its previous decisions, it maintains the authority to overrule any decision reached on wrong principles – a power essential to keeping the stream of justice pure.
However, this fundamental principle highlights a troubling trend: the recent continuous emergence of contrary decisions of the Apex Court that did not consider biding precedents. This pattern has led to widespread mischaracterisation of such decisions as “conflicting” when they are, in fact, judgments made per incuriam.
Therefore, unlike per incuriam situations where earlier precedents are overlooked, a true conflict arises when the court consciously reaches a different conclusion after considering existing precedents. This distinction carries significant implications for legal certainty, proper judicial development, and the administration of justice in Nigeria.
To illustrate the practical implications of the above troubling development in our legal jurisprudence, let us consider a counsel standing before the Court of Appeal or any other lower court, confidently citing two decisions of the Supreme Court as “conflicting” to justify following the latter judgment. The opposing counsel then rises, pointing out that the latter judgment was decided per incuriam, having failed to consider binding precedents. This leaves the Court of Appeal in a quandary as it does not possess the power or latitude to declare a judgement or decision of the Supreme Court as having been given per incuriam and yet may hold that it cannot choose to follow the earlier binding decision on the basis that it has the freedom to do so.
This difference isn’t merely semantic – it fundamentally alters how these authorities should be treated by the lower courts and the Supreme Court itself. The foregoing hypothetical scenario, something now increasingly common in Nigerian courts, highlights a concerning trend in how we characterise or mischaracterise decisions of our Apex Court. The casual use of the word “conflicting” rather than “per incuriam” not only reflects a misunderstanding of these distinct legal concepts but also poses practical challenges for stare decisis, judicial consistency, legal certainty and advocacy.
II. Between Per Incuriam and Conflicting Decisions
A. The Fundamental Distinction:
When academics, practicing lawyers, writers, law reporters, analysts, commentators and others casually describe two Supreme Court judgments as ‘conflicting,’ they erroneously elevate both decisions to the status of binding authorities that lower courts may follow or choose between. This mischaracterisation fails to recognise that where a latter judgment contradicts an earlier one without considering it , that latter judgment is, by definition, per incuriam, not binding and lacks precedential value.
A judgment reached per incuriam cannot properly be regarded as creating a ‘conflict’ with earlier binding precedent – it is simply a decision made in error through inadvertent oversight of binding authority that should have guided its determination, and ought to be disregarded. See Okonkwo Ngwo, supra.
Understanding the distinction between truly conflicting and per incuriam judgments carries significant practical implications. A truly conflicting decision represents a valid alternative precedent. In contrast, a judgment per incuriam, is not binding and lacks precedential weight precisely because it was made without considering binding authority.
For practicing lawyers, understanding this distinction is crucial for:
a) Structuring and proffering legal arguments effectively
b) Properly guiding the courts on precedential value of cases
c) Maintaining consistency in judicial precedents and development
d) Ensuring accurate case reporting and analysis
5. The Nigerian legal system’s adherence to stare decisis makes this distinction particularly important. Thus, when we mischaracterise per incuriam decisions of the Supreme Court as ‘conflicting,’ we inadvertently legitimise judgments that are not binding , have limited precedential value and ought properly to be disregarded in subsequent decisions. This creates unnecessary confusion for all.
II. Some Notable Examples of Per Incuriam Decisions
16. Now, a careful examination of some decisions of the Supreme Court reveals disturbing patterns of several instances where the distinction between per incuriam and conflicting judgments becomes crucial for the purpose of characterising each judgement. The cases below are particularly illustrative of some per incuriam decisions:
i) Okafor v. Nweke (2007)
The decision of Supreme Court in Okafor v. Nweke (2007) exemplifies a significant per incuriamjudgment that has sowed widespread confusion in Nigerian legal jurisprudence and spawned numerous problematic decisions. In this case, the Court held that court processes signed by “J.H.C. OKOLO SAN & CO.” were invalid on the grounds that a law firm is not a legal practitioner recognised by law.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court regrettably overlooked its own binding precedent in Cole v. Martins (1968), where it had established clear principles regarding signatures of registered law firms on court processes. The Cole decision had explicitly held that “it is a sufficient compliance with the requirement for a legal practitioner to sign and give his name, if a legal practitioner practicing alone gives the name under which he is registered as a business name, as this can only refer and apply to the legal practitioner who so holds himself out as practising under that business name.” This earlier decision, without a doubt, had sensibly recognised that where a legal practitioner registers alone (and not with any other person) a business name, the use of that business name constitutes legally sufficient identification of that particular legal practitioner for the purpose of the Legal Practitioner’s Act and substantially satisfies its provisions.
The true meaning of the phrase in Cole – ‘if a legal practitioner practising alone gives the name under which he is registered‘ – becomes clear when properly contextualized. The words ‘practising alone’simply refer to a situation where only one legal practitioner has registered a particular business name as his practicing name. This was precisely the case in Cole, where the process signed as ‘Lardner & Co.’ was held valid because it was the registered business name under which Mr. Lardner practiced.”
ii) The Okafor Decision and Its Oversight
In Okafor, it must be stressed, the Court faced a substantially similar situation as in Cole but reached an entirely different conclusion without considering or addressing Cole v. Martins. The Court, Per Onnoghen JSC, focused on whether a law firm could be a legal practitioner, rather than examining, as done in Cole v. Martins, whether the signature could be properly attributed to an identifiable legal practitioner.
This disturbing decision then led to a perpetuation of errors and subsequent attempts to address this oversight only help to reveal the problematic nature of the decision in Okafor. In SLB Consortium Ltd v NNPC (2011), Onnoghen JSC in a concurring judgement expressed “doubt” about Cole v. Martinswithout properly engaging with its reasoning or explicitly overruling it and stuck , along with other justices on the panel , to his decision in Okafor.
Furthermore, in FBN v Maiwada (2012), despite empanelling a Full Court and inviting eleven amici curiae, the Supreme Court maintained the Okafor position without adequately or effectively addressing the Cole precedent as it was obligated to do and recognising fundamentally that Okaforwas decided per incuriam and ought to be properly disregarded.
iii) Justice Ejembi Eko’s Critical Analysis
More recently, in Ajibode & Others v Gbadamosi & Others (2021), Justice Ejembi Eko provided what can be described as a glimmer of hope with a powerful critique of the rigid application of Okafor. Justice Ejembi Eko’s powerful dissentient in this case rightly characterised the rigid application of Okafor as “crass technicality” and emphasised three crucial points: First, that the failure to properly sign court processes is fundamentally a matter of procedural jurisdiction which can be waived. Second, that courts should prioritise substantial justice rather than rigid adherence to technical irregularities. Third, that it offends equity for a defendant who participated in proceedings without objection at the lower courts and after several years of litigation to later challenge the process at the Apex Court , as defective.
This reasoning powerfully aligns with both common sense and substantive justice, and equally recognizes the fundamental unfairness of punishing litigants for technical oversights of their counsels.
III) Other Notable Examples of Per Incuriam and/ Conflicting Decisions:
1. On Competence of Notice of Appeal:
The relationship between Saleh v Abah (2017) and Odeh v Alaga (2021) regarding service of notice of appeal presents a most striking illustration of judicial uncertainty at the Supreme Court. In Saleh, the Apex Court Per Bage JSC unanimously held that “service of a notice of appeal on the respondent’s counsel at the lower court is good, competent and effective service on the respondent,” emphasising that the “real essence of the Supreme Court Rules on notice” is to prevent surprise and ensure adequate opportunity to be heard.
However, barely four years later in Odeh, while addressing a preliminary objection to the competence of service of notice of appeal, the Supreme Court split sharply (4-3) on this same issue. The majority of 4, Per Nweze JSC, upheld the preliminary objection, holding that failure to effect personal service of notice of appeal “constitutes a fundamental vice which renders the appeal incompetent.” This stark departure from Saleh occurred despite the citation of Saleh. The majority’s characterisation that “failure to serve a process where service is required renders the proceedings null and void” appears difficult to reconcile with Saleh‘s more purposive approach focused on actual notice rather than in this instance mere technical compliance.
The force of this contradiction is powerfully captured in the 3 dissenting judgments. Ogunwumiju JSC emphasised that “the filing of a notice of appeal and its competence is quite different from the competence of the service,” while Agim JSC noted that “service of the notice of appeal is a separate and distinct process independent of its filing…Non-service or improper service of the notice of appeal has nothing to do with the competence of the notice of appeal.” Most pointedly, Agim JSC observed that where a respondent has “in fact received the notice of appeal,” they cannot object to the hearing merely because personal service was not effected. This robust dissent, grounded in both precedent and principle, suggests that Odeh represents more than mere conflict – it exemplifies how different panels of the same court can fundamentally disagree about core procedural requirements, creating profound uncertainty for practitioners and litigants alike.
2. Transfer of Cases Between Courts:
In Amalgamated Trustees Limited v. Associated Discount House Limited (2007), the Supreme Court , thoughtfully and helpfully , confronted its own per incuriam decision regarding the power of State High Courts to transfer cases to the Federal High Court. The sequence began with Fasakin Foods (Nig.) Ltd. v. Shosanya (2006), where the Court held that while the Federal High Court can transfer a case to a State High Court, the reverse was not possible under section 22(3) of the Federal High Court Act.
But, in Associated Discount House Ltd. v. Amalgamated Trustees Ltd (2006), Pats-Acholonu JSC, without referencing Fasakin, reached the opposite conclusion, stating that ‘The lower court had said that there is no law empowering the State High Court to transfer a case to the Federal High Court. With greatest respect I beg to disagree… The tenor and intendment of this subsection is that the State High Court can validly make an order of a transfer of a case from itself to a court of different jurisdiction.’ The Supreme Court later acknowledged in Amalgamated Trustees that its decision in Associated Discount House was made per incuriam for failing to consider the binding precedent in Fasakin. This case sequence is particularly noteworthy as it represents a rare instance where the Supreme Court explicitly recognised its own per incuriam decision and treated it as such.
3.On admissibility of unregistered Title documents:
The jurisprudential tension between Benjamin v. Kalio (2018) and Abdullahi v. Adetutu (2020) epitomises the doctrinal instability that arises when apex courts engage in silent departures from precedent. In Benjamin, a seven-member panel of the Supreme Court conducted a rigorous constitutional and statutory analysis, concluding—contrary to decades of precedent—that the Evidence Act 2011 supersedes land instrument registration laws of the states in determining admissibility (Ejembi Eko, JSC). This reasoning, while disruptive, was at least explicit in its confrontation with orthodoxy. By contrast, Abdullahi—decided by a five-member panel—simply reinstated the pre-Kalio rule without addressing Benjamin’s constitutional arguments or the primacy of the Evidence Act, thereby rendering it a textbook per incuriam decision for its failure to engage binding precedent.
The recent judgment of Supreme Court in Chief Ali Maged Taan v. SCOA (2024) compounds this problem. While the lead judgment (Ogbuinya, JSC) implicitly restored Abdullahi’s rule by ignoring Kalio entirely, the concurrent judgement of Abiru, JSC went further, declaring Kalio ‘abandoned’ and ‘not good law’ without substantive analysis of its reasoning. This judicial minimalism—rejecting a precedent through conclusory labels rather than a proper judicial distinction—exacerbates the very inconsistency the Supreme Court ought to resolve. If Kalio was wrongly decided, it demanded explicit overruling with due consideration of its constitutional logic; if Abdullahi’s per incuriam status, as we have argued, was to be cured, it required reconciliation with the primacy of Evidence Act as a federal legislation on evidentiary matters. Instead, the Supreme Court appears to be entrenching and very sadly too, a disturbing practice of implied overruling, where binding precedents vanish without trace or explanation, thus undermining predictability and doctrinal coherence. This creeping norm of silent departures at the Apex Court invites scholarly critique, for it appears to substitute unacceptable judicial fiat, for the reasoned evolution of law. This approach ought to be discontinued, in the overall interest of the orderly development of our case law.
4. On Appeals from the Legal Practitioners’ Disciplinary Committee (LPDC):
The Supreme Court’s approach to appeals from the Legal Practitioners’ Disciplinary Committee (LPDC) presents another instance of concerning jurisprudential uncertainty. In Akintokun v. LPDC (2014), interpreting section 12(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act, the Court held that appeals from LPDC directions must first go to the Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers. The Apex Court Per Galinje JSC emphasized that “an appellant cannot appeal direct to the Supreme Court against the direction of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee without first appealing to the Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers.” His Lordship found that the word “shall” in section 12(1) “denotes obligation or a command and gives no room for discretion,” making any direct appeal to the Supreme Court “incompetent” for want of jurisdiction.
Yet, in Obiajulu Nwalutu v NBA (2019), while acknowledging Akintokun, the Court proceeded to hear and determine a direct appeal from the LPDC’s direction under the same Legal Practitioners Act without addressing the jurisdictional question established in Akintokun. Although the main issue in Obiajulu concerned the proper constitution or competence of the LPDC rather than the appellate procedure, the Apex Court’s willingness to entertain a direct appeal, despite the mandatory language of section 12(1), creates uncertainty about the correct approach. This is particularly troubling given that questions of jurisdiction, being fundamental to the exercise of judicial power, should be considered even when not specifically raised by parties. The contrast between these decisions, interpreting the same statutory framework, that has far reaching implications , leaves legal practitioners in doubt about the proper forum for challenging LPDC directions.
5. Service of Court Process Outside Jurisdiction:
The relationship between MV Arabella v. NAIC (2008) and Akeredolu v Abraham (2019) illustrates the challenges of shifting judicial positions on service of Federal High Court processes. In MV Arabella, the Apex Court held that section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act applies to all High Courts, including the Federal High Court, emphasising that “it is a total misconception of the law to contend that the provision of the section is inapplicable to the Federal High Court because the jurisdiction of that court covers the entire nation.” The Court established that failure to endorse the required notice on a writ for service outside the state of issuance constitutes “a fundamental defect that renders the writ incompetent.”
Yet in Akeredolu, while acknowledging MV Arabella, the Court took a markedly different approach based on section 19(1) of the Federal High Court Act. The Apex Court Per Okoro JSC held that “the nationwide jurisdiction of the Federal High Court” means its processes “apply as a matter of law throughout the country as the processes of a single court issued within jurisdiction.” This interpretation effectively exempts Federal High Court processes from section 97 requirements – a position that appears difficult to reconcile with MV Arabella’s explicit holding. The coexistence of these conflicting interpretations creates significant uncertainty for practitioners regarding the proper procedure for service of Federal High Court processes across state boundaries. It also , we would argue , translates into two genuinely conflicting decisions of the Apex Court on this issue and arguably a lower Court should be free to pick and choose, as demonstrated below, which one of them appears to it to be correct in the case before them.
6. Fundamental Rights Jurisdiction:
The divergence between Adetona v. I.G. Ent. Ltd (2011) and F.U.T. Minna v Olutayo (2018) regarding the Federal High Court’s jurisdiction in fundamental rights cases represents another crucial example. In Adetona, the Supreme Court limited the jurisdiction of Federal High Court on fundamental human rights cases to fundamental rights matters connected to or arising from section 251 of the Constitution on the jurisdictional competence of the Federal High Court.
However, in F.U.T. Minna the Court appeared to expand this jurisdiction without addressing the binding precedent in Adetona. Again, this bears the hallmarks of a per incuriam decision rather than a real conflict, as it fundamentally altered jurisdictional principles without engaging with and in apparent ignorance of the established precedent.
7. One Electoral Dispute – Declaration of winner in a primary election:
The relationship between CPC v Ombugadu (2013) and Gbileve v Addingi (2014) presents another instance of a per incuriam decision. In CPC v Ombugadu the Supreme Court decided that section 141 of the Electoral Act 2010 prevented declaring a non-participant in a political party’s primary election as winner of the subsequent ultimate general election.
However, the same Court in Gbileve reached a contrary conclusion regarding substituted candidates without addressing or distinguishing the binding precedent in CPC v Ombugadu. This failure to engage with established precedent marks this as another per incuriam decision rather than a real conflict.
The foregoing analysis reveals a troubling pattern of uncertainty created by the Supreme Court’s reluctance to properly identify and address its own per incuriam decisions. By failing to explicitly recognise decisions made without consideration of binding precedents, the Court inadvertently perpetuates their mischaracterisation as ‘conflicting decisions.’ This mischaracterisation not only confuses practitioners about which precedents truly bind them but also prevents lawyers from boldly identifying and presenting before the Apex Court for its recognition , decisions made per incuriam. The resulting jurisprudential confusion undermines the Court’s historically preeminent status and contributes to an erosion of confidence in its decision-making processes. The solution lies , in our respectful view , not in avoiding acknowledgment of per incuriam decisions but in confronting them directly to restore clarity and certainty to our legal system.
IV) The Challenges for Lower Courts
Apart from the challenges faced by lower courts in the uncertain terrain of observing helplessly per incuriam decisions (which they cannot under the doctrine of stare decisis pronounce upon as this must be left for the Apex Court to so declare), there is the additional challenge of drawing the distinction between apparently conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court. Clearly, drawing the distinction between apparently conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court, additionally becomes particularly crucial when considering how lower courts should handle such decisions.
Two distinct approaches have emerged over time regarding how lower courts should handle apparently conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court. One approach permits lower courts to choose which decision best serves the interest of justice in the circumstances before them. The other now more widespread approach mechanically requires courts to follow the most recent decision. We strongly and respectfully contend , with great respect, that it is the first approach that represents the correct position of law.
The Supreme Court in NEPA v Onah (1997) established a clear principle regarding how lower courts should handle apparently conflicting decisions of superior courts. The Apex Court held that where a superior court handed down conflicting decisions, the lower court or a court of coordinate jurisdiction is at liberty to choose between the decisions which appeared to be correct and follow same.
This principle not only respects judicial discretion but also acknowledges the unique position of lower courts to evaluate which precedent better serves justice in the specific circumstances before them. The practical application of this principle was well demonstrated in Oliko & Anor v. Okonkwo & Ors (1977), where the Court of Appeal thoughtfully exercised this discretion by opting to follow Babajide v. Aris & Anor (1966) while declining to follow Bowaje v. Adediwura (1968).
However, several years after NEPA v Onah, an aspect of the Supreme Court judgment in Osakue v Federal College of Education (Technical) Asaba (2010) dealing with how lower courts should handle conflicting decisions , an issue which only arose , from the Apex court considering the question of whether or not the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit , demonstrates a remarkable judicial summersault. While addressing this issue . Ogbuagu JSC first emphatically declared that “For the umpteen time, where there appear to be conflicting judgement of this court, the latter or latest, will or should apply and must be followed if the circumstances are the same.” Yet, in the same judgment, his Lordship contradicted this mechanical rule by acknowledging that “where there is no discernable ratio decidendi common to the decisions of a superior court and this court has handed down conflicting decisions, the lower court or a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction is free to choose between the decisions which appear to it to be correct,” citing NEPA v Onah itself.
This internal contradiction is further compounded by his Lordship’s additional statement that “where the principles enumerated in any decision of this court, is not relevant or applicable to the issue or issues arising for determination in the case before the Court of Appeal or lower court, that is a different matter or a different ball game.” These conflicting pronouncements in the same judgment, despite referencing NEPA v Onah, makes it difficult to appreciate or comprehend what was actually decided in Osakue on this point.
In our considered view, the entire judgment in Osakue in any case must first be considered to have been made per incuriam on its central jurisdictional holding. The Court’s decision that the applicable law for jurisdictional challenges is that existing when the issue was raised relied wholly on Olutola v UNIILORIN (2004), which itself , we contend , was decided per incuriam for overlooking binding precedents established as far back as 1992. These overlooked authorities, including Uwaifo v A.G of Bendel State (1982) and Onyema & Ors v Oputa & Ors (1987), clearly established that jurisdictional questions are determined by the law existing when the cause of action arose, not when the jurisdictional challenge is raised.
Given that Osakue is fundamentally per incuriam on its core jurisdictional holding, no principle of law stated to be emanating from it, including the mechanical “later-in-time” rule, can claim to be binding or of any legitimate precedential value. This is particularly significant as Osakue is commonly cited as the foundation for the “later-in-time” approach to handling conflicting decisions.
Moreover, even the Court’s treatment of conflicting decisions in Osakue is doubly flawed. First, it directly contradicts the binding precedent in NEPA v Onah while paradoxically citing it with approval. Second, and perhaps more tellingly, it contradicts itself by simultaneously affirming and denying lower courts’ discretion to choose between conflicting decisions. This judicial summersault within a single judgment further undermines any legitimacy of the “later-in-time” rule it purports to establish.
Unfortunately, subsequent decisions which should have treated Osakue as having been decided per incuriam have regarded it erroneously as binding authority. Most recently in Edeoga Chijioke Jonathan & Ors v INEC (2023). The extent of this misapplication is starkly evident in PDP v Uche [2023], where Agim JSC declared with apparent finality that when lower courts follow the most recent of two conflicting Supreme Court decisions, this approach ‘has acquired the force and character of a legal principle.’ We respectfully disagree. An approach rooted in self-contradictory reasoning that fails to properly engage with binding precedent cannot acquire legitimate status as a legal principle let alone a binding principle.
Regrettably , the above position adopted by the eminent Agim JSC in PDP v Uche regarding the “later-in-time” approach is particularly surprising and difficult to understand, given his Lordship’s earlier, well-reasoned and justified approach to conflicting decisions. While delivering the lead judgment of the Court of Appeal in Okorie Ndulue & Ors v Nnoruka Obinaguoha & Ors (2013), his Lordship forcefully supported lower courts’ discretion to choose between conflicting Supreme Court decisions, stating: “As it is, the Court is faced with two conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court on this point. So, I have to choose and pick which to follow. I prefer to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of PAM v GWOM and GOLOK v DIYAPWAN, because the later decision of the Supreme Court did not state that it was departing from them and why they were not followed.”
This very careful and well thought out position, taken by Agim JCA ( as he then was ) in Okorie ( supra), well after Osakue was decided, represents, we would argue , the correct approach to handling conflicting decisions. His Lordship’s subsequent holding in PDP v Uche that the mechanical “later-in-time” rule “ has acquired the force and character of a legal principle” therefore appears to be, in our respectful view , an unforced error that has unfortunately further muddled the jurisprudential landscape. We expect that his Lordship will, in his characteristic manner, take the earliest opportunity now in the Apex Court to correct this position and restore much needed clarity to this important area of the law.
Having regard to the foregoing, we strongly contend that the principle relevant and established in NEPA v Onah remains the binding authority on the right approach to resolve conflicting judgements of superior courts. The discretion it grants to lower courts to choose between apparently conflicting decisions based on which better serves the interests of justice is not only legally sound but practically beneficial to the coherence of the system.
This approach recognises that the application of precedent requires careful consideration of context and consequences, not merely chronological ordering. It empowers lower courts to make reasoned choices based on the unique circumstances of each case, promoting substantive justice over mechanical adherence to rule. The self-contradictory nature of Osakue on this point, and subsequent decisions that perpetuate its error, have inadvertently obscured rather than developed this fundamental principle of our jurisprudence.
V. The Problematic Concept of “Implied Overruling”
The Supreme Court’s recent attempt to justify its not well conceived departure from precedents through the concept of “implied overruling,” as demonstrated in the same case of PDP v. Uche (2023), ( supra) presents yet another troubling development in Nigerian legal jurisprudence. In this case, Agim JSC attempted to legitimise , the notion that later decisions could effectively overrule earlier ones without any explicit consideration or engagement with binding precedents. This approach suggests that Cole v. Martins has been ‘impliedly overruled’ by subsequent decisions, despite these decisions never explicitly engaging with or analysing its principles. Again, for the most respected Law lord it marked a volte face from his lordship’s unassailable decision quoted above , in Ndulue ( supra ) and this without providing any rationale.
The concept of implied overruling of earlier decisions as raised in PDP raises some concerns. This troubling development is particularly evident in how the Court has retrospectively attempted to justify its treatment of binding previous cases like Cole v. Martins. Rather than acknowledging that decisions like Okafor v. Nweke and other cases were made per incuriam for not considering Cole and other binding previous decisions in those cases , the Court now suggests that Cole and those other cases were “impliedly overruled.” This approach not only fails to address the fundamental issue of precedential oversight but also threatens to institutionalise without justification the very legally doubtful practice that our analysis respectfully criticises in this article.
While the concept of implied overruling is fairly well recognised in our jurisprudence in the context of statutory interpretation especially regarding Constitutional supremacy over inconsistent laws, its application to judicial precedents and decisions is problematic. Indeed, the rather casual adoption or seemingly arbitrary use of this principle by the Supreme Court in PDP and without establishing measurable standards or providing reasoned justification, threatens to undermine the doctrine of stare decisis and create even more uncertainty.
The concept of implied overruling, it must be noted, is fairly rooted in some other jurisdictions, for instance the American legal jurisprudence. The United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the concept offers instructive insights. In Asher v. Texas (1888), the Court recognised that irreconcilable conflict between decisions could result in implied overruling.
However, this approach was significantly restricted by the Court in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. (1989), which required lower courts to follow directly controlling precedents even when they appear to rest on rejected reasoning. This restrictive approach appears on page 484 of the decision where the Court stated: “If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Courts of Appeal should follow the case which directly controls leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” This effectively tries to prohibit lower courts from recognising implied overruling, requiring them to follow older binding decisions notwithstanding that some newer decisions might have been reached on a line of reasoning that rejects the foundational reasoning for the binding precedent , until the Supreme Court itself explicitly overrules them.
As Chief Justice Charles Hughes emphasised in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank (1940), implied overruling may have legitimacy in statutory interpretation where “the actual existence of a statute…may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.” This principle notably was specifically articulated in the context of statutory and constitutional validity.
It is true and must be acknowledged and appreciated that , in the United States, scholars have critically examined the practice of implied overruling in judgements of courts. Christopher J. Peters(2008) notably critiqued this approach, pejoratively characterising it as “under-the-table overruling.”
By contrast, the UK Supreme Court’s approach emphasises express departures from precedent. As recently outlined in a 2023 presentation by Lord Philip Sales of the UK Supreme Court, the Court treats precedent itself as a defeasible default rule, where departures from precedent require sufficient justification to overcome the strong presumption of stability. This calibrated approach seeks to balance legal certainty with the need for incremental development of the law.
In the UK, this is generally governed by principles established since the Practice Statement [1966], which established the Supreme Court’s power to depart from its own precedents and through which the House of Lords announced its power to depart from previous decisions. While recognising this power, the Statement emphasised the fundamental importance of precedent for legal certainty.
The restraint in exercising this power is evident in recent UK Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Knauer v Ministry of Justice [2016], the Court emphasised the need to be ‘very circumspect’ before departing from precedent, and in Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust [2020], the Supreme Court stressed the importance of not undermining ‘the role of precedent and the certainty which it promotes.’ This structured and cautious approach contrasts sharply with the Nigerian Supreme Court’s almost casual reference to implied overruling and its seeming adoption and application in PDP v Uche as well as the widespread approach of handing down later decisions , that mostly do not engage in any way whatsoever, with earlier binding precedents and insisting that the later decisions must be followed.
Clearly, the approach to implied overruling as suggested by Agim JSC in PDP v. Uche, misconstrues the fundamental nature of stare decisis. In the realm of case law precedents, proper judicial development demands explicit engagement with earlier decisions.
As Snyder (1940) articulated in his seminal work, while superior courts may implicitly overrule precedents, this occurs only in specific circumstances where later decisions have thoroughly engaged with earlier principles, even without expressly overruling them. Thus, implied overruling requires ‘careful consideration of context’ and cannot be justified merely by the existence of a later contrary decision that fails to address binding precedent.
The fundamental question remains: Should the concept be adopted and applied wholesale without guardrails ? While courts must indeed adapt legal interpretations to reflect evolving understandings of justice and changing societal norms, such adaptation must be principled and transparent.
The above stated misapplication is particularly concerning as the Nigerian Supreme Court has provided no clear guidelines for determining when implied overruling occurs. While the US Supreme Court approach through Rodriguez de Quijas, supra, at least provides clear direction to lower courts when faced with conflicting decisions, and the UK framework through cases like Henderson, supra, emphasises the importance of certainty and express overruling, the Nigerian approach creates uncertainty by suggesting mere inconsistency with later decisions constitutes implied overruling. The proper course, consistent with both major common law traditions, is to require courts to explicitly engage with earlier precedents.
Against the foregoing background, we are of the strong and most considered view , that the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal as the superior courts engaging in precedential evolution in Nigeria should:
a) Always explicitly acknowledge and engage with earlier precedents where applicable
b) Clearly explain why new holdings make earlier precedents untenable
c) Provide clear guidance to lower courts
This structured framework, drawing on elements from both US and UK approaches, would better serve legal certainty than the current Nigerian approach which legitimises post facto what are often clear instances of per incuriam decisions or truly conflicting decisions that do not fully engage with binding precedents nor provide any well reasoned rationale for them .
Ultimately, the suggested doctrine of implied overruling by the Nigerian Supreme Court makes our call in this article for proper characterisation of decisions even more crucial and urgent. However, the solution lies not in completely rejecting the possibility of implied overruling, but in developing clearer principles for when and how courts should recognise that later decisions have effectively displaced earlier ones.
VI. Some Practical Implications of Panel Inconsistency, Conflicting Judgements and Unacknowledged Per Incuriam Decisions:
The foregoing analysis reveals why precise characterisation of Supreme Court decisions is critically important. The mischaracterisation of per incuriam decisions as “conflicting” creates profound challenges for the Nigerian legal system. When we incorrectly label decisions that failed to consider binding precedents, we inadvertently legitimise departures from established legal principles, creating a systemic cascade of jurisprudential problems and confusion.
For the lower courts, this mischaracterisation creates unnecessary confusion about which precedent to follow. When apparently conflicting decisions exist, lower courts might feel compelled to follow the later decision under the “later-in-time” rule, rather than exercising their judicial discretion to analyse the decisions, distinguish them where appropriate, and choose the precedent that better serves the interests of justice in the case before them. This mechanical approach undermines thoughtful judicial analysis and creates inconsistent application of legal principles across different courts.
Legal practitioners face equally serious challenges. By treating per incuriam decisions as alternative precedents rather than recognising their limited precedential value, lawyers risk constructing legal arguments on fundamentally unstable foundations. This not only affects the quality of legal submissions but potentially compromises their clients’ interests in fundamental ways. The case of law firm signatures on court processes, discussed below, provides a stark illustration of how rapidly shifting judicial positions can leave practitioners in an impossible position – a process filed competently today on a supposedly valid authority might be declared void ab initio tomorrow based on a new decision from a different panel of the Supreme Court.
The practical consequences of this jurisprudential uncertainty are starkly illustrated by the Supreme Court’s recent contradictory decisions on the competence of court processes signed by law firms and the underlying court proceedings. In Heritage Bank Ltd. v. Bentworth Fin. (Nig.) Ltd [2018],addressing a statement of claim signed by “Beatrice Fisher & Co.” challenged for the first time at the Supreme Court, Ejembi Eko JSC who delivered the lead judgement offered a promising path forward. His Lordship held that “in spite of the fact that the statement of claim was allegedly not signed by a known legally qualified Legal Practitioner, but by a firm of Legal Practitioners, the appellant, as the defendant, condoned the defective process.” His Lordship emphasised that where parties had “participated in the proceedings and evidence arising from the statement of claim was called after the statement of defence joining issues with the defective statement of claim was filed… without objection,” they had “clearly condoned the defective statement of claim and waived his right to object to this defective process.”
However, barely a year later in Yusuf v. Mobil Oil (Nig.) Plc [2019], a different panel of the Supreme Court maintained the strict position established in cases like Okafor v. Nweke. Addressing the same core issue of competence of a court process where a 3rd and 4th amended statements of claim were signed by “Ayinde Sanni & Co.” rather than a named legal practitioner, Okoro JSC declared that “any court process signed in the name of a law firm which cannot be found on the roll of legal practitioners is incompetent, null, void ab initio, and liable to be struck out.” His Lordship characterised this not as a mere procedural technicality but as “one of substantive law by virtue of the statutory provisions in the Legal Practitioners Act.” This strict position, despite the glimmer of hope offered by Heritage Bank, demonstrates how quickly and confusingly, the goalposts can shift in our jurisprudence.
This rapid shift in judicial position creates profound practical challenges. The uncertainty is compounded by the fact that these decisions came from different panels of the same Court within months of each other, with the latter decision failing to explicitly overturn or distinguish the former. This changing of goalposts mid-game undermines legal certainty and creates a treacherous environment for both practitioners and litigants.
The Supreme Court’s sharp division in Odeh v Alaga over service requirements, coming just four years after its unanimous position in Saleh v Abah, presents another dimension of practical challenges. When the Court divides 4-3 on fundamental procedural requirements – with powerful dissenting opinions questioning the majority’s approach – practitioners face an impossible dilemma. Not only must they navigate between conflicting decisions from different panels, but they must also contend with the possibility that a slight change in panel composition could produce entirely different outcomes on basic procedural issues. This uncertainty is particularly acute where, as in Odeh, the division concerns preliminary procedural matters that could nullify years of litigation.
The Supreme Court itself, we respectfully contend though with trepidation, bears significant responsibility for this systemic issue. While the Court possesses the power to reverse itself, instances where judgments overlook rather than explicitly engage with or overturn precedents—as evidenced in cases like PDP v. Uche and casual suggestion of “implied overruling”—place legal stakeholders in an untenable position.
As demonstrated in comparative jurisdictions like the United Kingdom, where Lord Philip Salesemphasised the need for “sufficient justification to overcome the strong presumption of stability,” the Nigerian Supreme Court could remedy this through proactive judicial leadership.
Moreover, it must be appreciated and recognised that the stabilising doctrine of stare decisis is fundamentally undermined by not acknowledging and identifying per incuriam decisions. By failing to distinguish between legitimate judicial disagreement and inadvertent precedential oversight, the legal system weakens its own structural integrity. This approach creates profound uncertainty in legal development and potentially encourages further departures from established principles.
The solution lies not in wholesale rejection of judicial flexibility, but in developing a more structured approach to precedent. Drawing from comparative legal traditions, the Nigerian Supreme Court should:
a) Always explicitly and properly acknowledge earlier precedents where applicable and give effect to them
(b) Always identify and acknowledge decisions that are per incuriam and treat them as not binding and disregard them in clear language.
Such a framework would restore the principled development of case law while maintaining the essential predictability of judicial reasoning.
VII. Recommendations for Reform
Arresting the Tide of Per Incuriam Decisions
To arrest the floodgate of continuous decisions that are made per incuriam and to address the Court’s apparent difficulty in identifying and properly characterising its own per incuriam decisions – a challenge that has created profound uncertainty in our jurisprudence – we recommend a comprehensive framework of reforms. These recommendations acknowledge that while the Court’s overwhelming workload contributes to this challenge, structural and procedural reforms can significantly reduce the occurrence of per incuriam decisions and their mischaracterisation.
The Supreme Court must spearhead some procedural institutional reform by taking steps that include establishing a very robust judicial clerkship system that enhances scholarly rigour in decision-making process. This system would provide critical research support, enabling Justices to conduct comprehensive precedential analysis and mitigate the risks of inadvertent or casual “implied overruling” of established precedents.
On the clerkship system, it must be recognised that the current practice of appointing judicial or research assistants, unfortunately, is very weak often resulting in the selection of individuals based more on connections rather than competence. The idea of leaving individual justices already under a stultifying workload, to labour to find and appoint their clerks is unhelpful and should be discontinued forthwith. To establish a truly effective clerkship system therefore, the Supreme Court must institute an open, merit-based selection process. This should include: limited public advertisements of clerkship positions; transparent qualification criteria emphasising academic excellence and research capabilities; a rigorous examination process testing legal research and writing skills; and structured interviews conducted by a panel of Justices and senior legal academics. Additionally, the Court should establish fixed tenure periods for clerks, competitive remuneration to attract top talent, and clear ethical guidelines to maintain the integrity of the clerkship system.
Further to the above, and in order to create a mechanism that ensures explicit engagement with existing precedents and proper identification of per incuriam decisions, we propose establishing a three-tier protocol:
a) First, the Supreme Court Registry should maintain a digital database of all Supreme Court decisions, categorised by subject matter and legal principles, with cross-referencing capabilities to identify related precedents.
b) Second, before delivering any judgment that appears to depart from previous positions, the Court should mandate a “Precedent Impact Assessment” where research clerks systematically review and document all relevant binding precedents.
c) Third, the Court should institute a practice direction requiring counsel to file a “Precedent Review Statement” in their briefs, explicitly addressing how their arguments align with or justify departure from existing precedents.
Given the concerning pattern of different panels reaching contradictory decisions, as starkly illustrated by the sharp division in Odeh v Alaga, we further propose that cases involving potential departures from established precedent should be heard by an enlarged panel of the Court. Additionally, where significant divisions emerge during panel deliberations on precedential matters, the Chief Justice should be consider reconstituting an enlarged panel to ensure comprehensive consideration of the issues at stake. Without a doubt, all these suggestions as to the way forward equally apply to the Court of Appeal as well being the intermediate court that must guide the High Courts as well and provide leadership.
Lower courts require nuanced guidance in navigating apparently conflicting Supreme Court decisions. Instead of mechanical rule application, these courts should be encouraged by the Supreme Court to exercise the freedom to pick and choose which of truly conflicting decisions of the Apex Court to follow. Crucially, lower courts must demonstrate and exercise the courage to thoughtfully distinguish between conflicting precedents properly so called and where appropriate exercise their judicial discretion to follow the precedent that better serves the interest of justice in the case before them.
This approach recognises the sophisticated role lower courts can play in maintaining judicial coherence while respecting hierarchical authority. The stark contrast between the unanimous decision in Saleh v Abah and the deeply divided court in Odeh v Alaga demonstrates that mechanical rule application cannot adequately address the complexities of conflicting precedents. Lower courts, being closest to the facts and circumstances of each case, are uniquely positioned to engage in thoughtful analysis of competing precedential authorities.
When lower courts demonstrate the courage to critically analyze truly conflicting precedents and make reasoned choices, the Supreme Court must encourage rather than stifle such judicial reasoning. The judiciary’s framework must foster sophisticated legal interpretation that maintains the fundamental principles of stare decisis while avoiding blind adherence to chronology. This balanced approach better serves the interests of justice than rigid mechanical rules that may perpetuate rather than resolve jurisprudential inconsistencies.
Legal practitioners have an equally crucial role in addressing this challenge through their daily practice. Beyond traditional legal research, they should develop sophisticated strategies for identifying and distinguishing per incuriam decisions and inviting the Supreme Court to declare them as such and or indeed equally invite the Apex Court to overrule itself in appropriate cases.
This requires maintaining comprehensive records of precedential developments and providing courts with substantive analysis that transcends mere technical compliance. In short, legal practitioners must become active participants in promoting judicial coherence, treating precedent not as a static set of rules but as a dynamic framework for justice.
In this regard we commend the forceful and illuminating words of the well respected jurist Oputa JSC in the case of Adegoke Motors v. Odesanya (1989) where his Lordship challenged legal practitioners to action in the following memorable words to wit: “when therefore it appears to learned counsel that any decision of this Court has been given per incuriam, such counsel should have the boldness and courage to ask that such a decision be overruled.”
The broader Nigerian legal ecosystem—including academic institutions and professional bodies—has a crucial role in driving systemic reform. This effort demands conducting systematic analysis of Supreme Court decisions, facilitating dialogue between judiciary and legal practitioners, and developing educational initiatives that promote a more nuanced understanding of precedential development.
Academic institutions, in particular, can serve as critical external reviewers, offering scholarly perspectives on judicial inconsistencies and proposing valuable frameworks for addressing precedential challenges.
Ultimately, our proposed systemic reform entails developing mechanisms for regular review of precedential consistency and establishing clear protocols for addressing decisions that are per incuriam. and or conflicting in the true sense .
This should be accompanied by guidelines for lower courts in choosing between apparently conflicting decisions, all while promoting transparency in judicial pronouncements. Such reform must be comprehensive yet practical, acknowledging the real-world constraints under which our legal system operates while striving for optimal judicial coherence and integrity.
B. Addressing Structural Constraints
While the above reforms are critical, we must acknowledge that the Supreme Court operates under significant constraints. The sheer volume of appeals reaching the Court is undoubtedly a challenge. Constitutional amendment to restrict the Court’s jurisdiction to truly significant matters of law, similar to other apex courts worldwide, would enable it to focus on developing more coherent jurisprudence rather than being overwhelmed by routine appeals. This structural reform, while important, should follow rather than precede the implementation of our recommended measures for preventing and properly identifying per incuriam decisions and other suggestions.
The Apex Court leadership should also consider identifying more quickly interlocutory appeals raising purely jurisdictional questions and treat them as urgent matters to be dealt with expeditiously in a concerted effort to reduce its docket.
VIII. Conclusion
The distinction between truly conflicting decisions and those reached per incuriam is fundamental to maintaining coherence in our legal system. Thus, the intricate fabric of legal jurisprudence depends on precise characterisation of judicial decisions.
Our analysis reveals a critical systemic challenge: the casual mischaracterisation or misidentification of per incuriam judgments and decisions of the Supreme Court as conflicting, a problem now exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s recent suggestion of the problematic concept of “implied overruling.” This mischaracterisation is not a mere semantic issue but a fundamental threat to the integrity of Nigeria’s judicial system.
The consequences of imprecise judicial labelling extend far beyond academic discourse. By failing to distinguish between genuine legal conflicts and decisions that inadvertently overlook binding precedents, we risk creating a parallel jurisprudential landscape that undermines established legal principles. This approach introduces uncertainty, weakens judicial hierarchy, and compromises the fundamental predictability that stare decisis seeks to maintain. Moreover, by not sufficiently engaging with binding precedents and distinguishing and or overruling them in clear terms the Supreme Court creates such uncertainty that makes the legal process lose its credibility.
The stark division in Odeh v Alaga, coming barely four years after the unanimous decision in Saleh v Abah on the same procedural issue, vividly illustrates part of this problem. When different panels of the Supreme Court reach contradictory conclusions – with one panel unanimously accepting service of notice of appeal on counsel as valid and another splitting 4-3 to invalidate such service – the resulting uncertainty ripples through the entire legal system. Such fundamental disagreements about basic procedural requirements, crystallized in powerful dissenting opinions, demonstrate how panel inconsistency can undermine the predictability essential to judicial administration.
Addressing this challenge requires a comprehensive, multi-institutional approach. The Supreme Court must lead by example, not only in explicitly acknowledging and identifying per incuriam decisions, but also in addressing apparent conflicts in its decisions through enlarged panels where necessary. As the sharply divided court in Odeh demonstrates, significant precedential questions deserve thorough consideration by an expanded bench to minimise panel inconsistency. Lower courts must be encouraged by the Supreme Court to make thoughtful nuanced analysis of truly conflicting precedents, choosing between them in ways that prioritise substantive justice over mechanical rule application. Legal practitioners must develop more sophisticated approaches to precedential analysis, including systematic tracking of panel decisions, treating legal research as a critical tool for maintaining judicial coherence.
The Supreme Court’s overwhelming caseload – with an appalling clearance rate and hundreds of new appeals filed annually – demands urgent constitutional reform to restrict its jurisdiction to truly significant matters of law. This would allow the Apex Court to focus on its proper role of developing coherent jurisprudence rather than being bogged down by routine appeals. For a start it must be empowered to be a mandatory court rather than a discretionary court essentially ensuring at the least that it is the Apex Court alone that should grant leave to appeal to the court on issues of mixed law and fact.
The path forward demands collective commitment to precision and institutional reform. By developing clear protocols for identifying and addressing per incuriam judgments, and by engaging more with binding precedents and distinguishing and or overuling them, the Supreme Court can provide the leadership for the restoration of confidence in the judicial process. As highlighted the entire legal community also has a role to play in this regard. This is not merely an academic exercise but a practical necessity for ensuring that our legal system continues to serve its fundamental purpose of delivering principled, consistent justice.
Ultimately, Nigeria’s judicial development requires more than just identifying per incuriam decisions – it demands creating a systemic framework to prevent their occurrence and establish clear mechanisms for their resolution. It demands greater engagement with binding precedents and the creation of greater certainty in judicial outcomes.
The Supreme Court must reclaim its past glory as a preeminent judicial institution whose decisions commanded respect and were frequently cited throughout the Commonwealth and beyond. This article has identified how recurring per incuriam decisions and their mischaracterisation, failure to acknowledge and treat them as such , increasing number of truly conflicting decisions among other challenges, has eroded both the Court’s reputation and the effectiveness of justice delivery in Nigeria. Through institutional accountability, rigorous scholarship, and an unwavering commitment to legal integrity, these challenges can be transformed into opportunities for meaningful judicial reform and development by a committed and proactive Supreme Court leadership.
UWAIFO v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BENDEL STATE (1982) 7 SC. 124
Yusuf v. Mobil Oil (Nig.) Plc (2020) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1710) 1
B. United Kingdom Cases
Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust [2020] UKSC 43
Knauer v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 9
Nicholas v Penny [1950] 2 KB 466
Young v Bristol Aeroplane Ltd [1944] KB 718
C. United States Cases
Asher v Texas 128 U.S. 129 (1888)
Chicot County Drainage District v Baxter State Bank (1940) 60 S.Ct., 317
Rodriguez de Quijas v Shearson/American Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477 (1989)
JOURNAL ARTICLES
Lord Philip Sales, ‘Default Rules in the Common Law: Substantive Rules and Precedent’ (International Workshop on Default Rules in Private Law, Oxford, 24 March 2023)
Ogowewo TI, ‘Self-Inflicted Constraints on Judicial Government in Nigeria’ (2005) 49(1) Journal of African Law 39
Snyder OC, ‘Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions’ (1940-1941) 35 Illinois Law Review 121
BOOKS
Black H, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th edn revised, Berthryte Publication 2023
Cross R, Precedent in English Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1961)
Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234
