Is Kidnapping Complete Without Ransom?

CASE TITLE: ABANOBI v. STATE LPELR-81735(SC)
JUDGMENT DATE: 13TH JUNE, 2025

JUSTICES: JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C.
TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.S.C.
CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.S.C.
HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.S.C.
MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.S.C.

PRACTICE AREA: CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

FACTS:

This appeal borders on criminal law and procedure.

This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Owerri Judicial Division (hereinafter referred to as the “Court of Appeal”), delivered on the 29th day of March, 2021. The Court of Appeal, in its judgment, affirmed the somber verdict of the High Court of Abia State, Isuikwuato Judicial Division therefore referred to as the “trial Court”).

The gravamen of the Prosecution’s case, as presented before the trial Court, was that the appellant, Ifeanyi Ananobi, acting in concert with his co-accused on the 26th day of October, 2014, kidnapped and took hostage of one Madam Lydia Acho. This venerable nonagenarian, a woman of ninety-eight (98) years, was purportedly abducted from her residence in Isuikwuato Local Government Area in Abia State. However, providence, it would seem, intervened, as the said Madam Lydia Acho was subsequently rescued on the same day within the confines of Ikuwano Local Government Area in Abia State following a car chase by the Police. The appellant and the second accused person were later apprehended at the locus criminis with the Appellant having sustained gunshot wounds.

The appellant, following his apprehension, made a statement to the Police (Exhibit “B”) and was the sole witness in his defence. His testimony recounts that he was en route from his ancestral home in Aba when he offered transportation to several passengers. In the course of the journey, he further testified that some of these passengers alighted from the vehicle, leaving two remaining passengers. It was the appellant’s testimony that these two remaining passengers subsequently commandeered the vehicle and utilized it in the commission of the kidnapping. He further testified that the Police pursued the vehicle, causing the kidnappers to crash into a tree and abandon the vehicle. The appellant’s testimony continued, stating that he was released by the fleeing kidnappers amidst a barrage of gunfire, one of which hit him.

The appellant further testified that, on the following morning, he came out from his purported concealment within the bush with the aim of reporting the incident of kidnapping at the Police Station. However, contrary to his alleged intention, he was instead apprehended by the Police and subsequently charged with the very act of kidnapping he intended to report

The Court of Appeal, in its judgment, affirmed the somber verdict of the trial Court.  At the trial Court, the appellant was convicted and sentenced to the ultimate forfeiture- death for the offence of kidnapping contrary to Section 3 (a) of the Abia State Prohibition of Terrorism, Kidnapping, Hostage Taking, Use of Offensive Weapon or Explosives and Other Threatening Behaviour Law, No. 10 of 2009.

Dissatisfied with the concurrent judgments of the Court, the Appellant filed the instant appeal.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION:

The Court determined the appeal on this sole issue and raised these questions reproduced hereunder, thus:

1. Whether the Court below having regard to the evidence on record was right when it upheld the judgment of the trial Court that the Prosecution proved its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Can it be unequivocally said that the demand for ransom payment is an indispensable element in all instances of kidnapping, such that the offence is legally confined solely to those situations where pecuniary exchange is sought for the victim’s release?
3. Put differently, does the demand for ransom payments constitutes an indispensable element, a sine qua non, for the offence of kidnapping to be established?

COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS:

It is the position of learned counsel for the appellant that the lower Court wrongly upheld the judgment of the trial Court that the Prosecution proved the offence of kidnapping against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It was further submitted that in line with the wordings of Section 3 (a) of the Abia State Prohibition of Terrorism, Kidnapping, Hostage Taking, Use of Offensive Weapon or Explosives and Other Threatening Behaviour Law, No. 10 of 2009, which creates the offence of kidnapping, the prosecution must prove that the person was kidnapped for purpose of payment of ransom. It was further contended that the Prosecution woefully failed to prove the offence of the kidnapping against the appellant, neither was there any evidence that the appellant kidnapped Madam Lydia Acho for purpose of payment of ransom. According to learned counsel, the prosecution’s witnesses PW1- PW4 never testified that the victim was kidnapped for the purpose of ransom. Learned counsel further advanced the contention that the trial Court in its judgment which was upheld by the lower Court wrongly relied heavily on the case of Ememobong Edet Umoh v. The State (2013) LPELR-21410 (CA) to arrive at the conclusion that the offence of kidnapping was proved against the appellant with or without demand for ransom. Submitting further, learned counsel for the appellant stated that the aforesaid case emanated from the High Court of Akwa Ibom State and pertained to a violation of Section 16 of the Akwa Ibom State Internal Security and Enforcement Law, 2009. This specific Section, he added, which defined kidnapping to mean; “To seize and take away a person by force or fraud, with or without a demand for ransom”, is not applicable to Abia state where the instant case originated. It was further submitted that the lower Court erroneously relied on the case of Okashetu v. The State (2016) 15 NWLR (Pt 1534) 126 at 148-149, because it emanated from the Delta State High Court and was not based on Section 3 (a) of the Abia State Prohibition of Terrorism, Kidnapping, Hostage Taking, Use of Offensive Weapon or Explosives and Other Threatening Behaviour Law, No. 10 of 2009. Learned counsel further posited that the failure of the prosecution to prove the mandatory ingredients of the offence implied that the prosecution failed to prove the offence charged against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It was the further contention of learned counsel for the appellant that in upholding the judgment of the trial Court, the lower Court relied heavily on the evidence of PW2. According to learned counsel, the evidence of PW2 as it relates to the appellant is unreliable and contradictory. The attention of this Court was drawn to what learned counsel perceived to be contradictions and lapses in the said evidence of PW2.

Submitting in opposition to the Appellant, learned counsel for the Respondent posited that in essence, the Appellant concedes that all other elements of the kidnapping offense were established by Prosecution at the trial Court. However, the Appellant’s contention rests solely on the argument that the prosecution did not sufficiently demonstrate that the act of kidnapping was committed with the specific intention of demanding and receiving payment of ransom. Learned counsel for the respondent therefore took the view that the central issue for determination by this Court is whether the prosecution adduced enough credible evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the kidnapping was carried out for the purpose of obtaining ransom, as stipulated Section 3 (a) of the Abia State Prohibition of Terrorism, Kidnapping, Hostage Taking, Use of Offensive Weapon or Explosives and Other Threatening Behaviour Law, No. 10 of 2009. It was further argued that the trial Court found, based on the evidence of PW2, that the intention of the appellant and co-marauders was to kidnap and take the 98-year-old victim for the purpose of payment of ransom, adding that the evidence of PW2 clearly demonstrates the intention behind the appellant’s actions as recounted by PW2. It was further contended that the argument at pages 114-117 of the record of appeal do not support any claim that PW2’s evidence was fabricated or disjointed. Instead, it was considered cogent and reliable by the trial Court and same was affirmed by the lower Court. According to learned counsel, the appellant attempted to discredit PW2’s testimony during cross-examination by casting doubt on PW2’s identity of the appellant and his co-marauders by suggesting that the light source she saw could have been misinterpreted as reflections. However, learned counsel pointed to PW2’s testimony from pages 116-117 of the record of appeal, where she was firm when she stated she saw the appellant from the touchlights they were flashing. The cases of UTTO v STATE (2022) 2 NWLR (PT. 1814) 369 AT 395; KNITITI v. TUOBOBO (1987) 1 ALL N.L.R. 198 AT 320; and LAYONU v. STATE (1967) 1 ALL N.L.R. 198 AT 201, were referred to in support of this submission. He urged the Court to resolve the issue against the Appellant.

DECISION/HELD:

In the final analysis, the appeal was dismissed for lacking in merits.

RATIO:

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE- OFFENCE OF KIDNAPPING: Ingredients necessary to establish the offence of kidnapping; whether a ransom must have been paid before the offence of kidnapping will be complete.

“It is noteworthy that the arguments canvassed by learned counsel have been meticulously tailored to the precise language of Section 3 (a) of the Abia State Prohibition of Terrorism, Kidnapping, Hostage Taking, Use of Offensive Weapon or Explosives and other Threatening Behaviour Law, No. 10 of 2009. This specific provision stipulates thus: (a) Any person, who, for purposes of payment of ransom kidnaps and takes another person hostage is guilt of an offence. The emphasis on this section suggests an acknowledgment of the distinction between the offence of kidnapping as understood within broader legal jurisprudence and the specific instance contemplated under this state legislation, where the element of “for purposes of payment of ransom” is expressly incorporated as a necessary and constituent element for establishing guilt. This distinction is pertinent when considering the general principles governing the offence of kidnapping. As consistently affirmed by a plethora of decided cases, the Prosecution discharges its burden of proving the offence of kidnapping beyond reasonable doubt when the evidence adduced demonstrates the unlawful taking of the victim, against his or her wish. In the case of Bello Okashetu v. The State (2016) LPELR-4001 (SC) 15-16, paras E-A, this Court, per Ogunbiyi, JSC, held thus: In order for the Prosecution to succeed under this count, it has to prove the following facts beyond reasonable doubt: (a) That the victim was seized, and taken away by the accused person; (b) That the victim was taken away against his consent; and (c) That the victim was taken away without lawful excuse. The offence of kidnapping is complete when the victim is carried away against his wish. See the case of R v. Cort (2004) 4 All ER 137. The essential elements, therefore, coalesce around the non-consensual deprivation of liberty through the physical removal of the person from his or her chosen location. This foundational understanding highlights a crucial point: the specific intention of the perpetrator is not a necessary element for the completion of the actus reus of kidnapping in all its forms. Jurisprudence on the offence of kidnapping extends beyond instances solely motivated by demand for payment of ransom. Criminals take hostages as a shield to help them escape from the scene of a crime, or the keys or secret codes needed to access areas where these are stored. In addition, kidnapping could also be motivated by personal grudges. This exposition is offered in response to the appellant’s contention that the lower Court erroneously placed reliance on the case of Okashetu v. The State (supra), a precedent which this Court also references within this judgment. It is crucial to clarify that the lower Court’s reference to the Okashetu’s case, pertains to the general principles defining the offence of kidnapping in its broader legal context, encompassing the essential elements applicable to all forms of the offense. The lower Court’s judgment, did not specifically confine its analysis to the particular species of kidnapping with which the appellant stands charged under Section 3 (a) of the Abia State Prohibition of Terrorism, Kidnapping, Hostage Taking, Use of Offensive Weapon or Explosives and other Threatening Behaviour Law, No. 10 of 2009. Section 3 (a) clearly prescribes that the kidnapping and taking another hostage must have been actuated by the intention to ask for or for the purposes of payment of ransom. It did not provide that for the offence of kidnapping to be complete, the ransom must have been paid. It only prescribed manifestation of an intention by the abductor of demanding for or obtaining payment of ransom. What this postulates is that where the definition of kidnapping includes abduction for some specific purpose, the mens rea that the prosecution must prove in order to obtain a conviction must include the specific purpose. Therefore, it is not enough to prove that the defendant intended to abduct the victim. In order to secure a conviction of the defendant, the Prosecution must prove that the defendant abducted the victim with the specific intention of obtaining payment of ransom. There must be an indication on the part of the defendant of trying to obtain an advantage or holding the victim for ransom. The Prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to detain the alleged victim in order to demand and obtain a sum of money for the alleged victim’s release. It does not matter whether the defendant in fact demanded money or whether the defendant succeeded in obtaining any money. There must be some overt act manifesting that intention.” Per OKORO, J.S.C.

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