Don Quixote In The Courtroom: Judicial Restraint and The Romance of Constitutional Battles

By Sumayyah Ayomide Ambali

In my course of legal research, I came across the witty diction of Lord Pats Acholonu, JCA, in the case of Abaribe v. Abia State House of Assembly (2002) 14 NWLR (pt. 788) at 486 paras F–G, where he observed that “The Court should not, however, attempt to assume for itself power it is never given by the constitution to brazenly enter into the miasma of the political cauldron and have itself bloodied and thereby lose respect in its quest to play the legendary Don Quixote De La Manche” (emphasis mine).

The court’s literary allusion to Don Quixote de la Mancha, a 17th-century Spanish knight, in the above case reiterates and applauds the ROLE of the court in Nigerian constitutional law.

Don Quixote is the main character in the classic Spanish novel Don Quixote De La Mancha by Miguel de Cervantes, published in the early 17th century. He is a nobleman driven by idealism who imagines himself a knight, fighting for justice but often misinterpreting reality. He famously mistakes windmills for giants and attacks them, believing he is doing something noble, and this is where the phrase tilting at windmills comes from. His actions, though noble in intent, often lead to chaos or ridicule.

Similarly, courts are regarded as knights, particularly from the above diction of my lord; therefore, courts are enjoined to avoid derailing from the reality while performing their duties. The courts are enjoined to desist from insisting on the impossible, just to stick to their constitutional duties.

Though the court invoked this allusion in the above case to caution against judicial overreach or romanticized interventions in political matters, as reiterated in the case of Peter v. Okoye (2002) 14 NWLR (pt.788) at 486 paras F – G per Fabiyi, JCA, thus:

As the custodians of the Constitution, judges are saddled with the responsibility of ensuring due functioning and enhancement of its provisions. There is a need to strive to ensure that our fledgling democracy is not allowed to lie prostrate. Due restraint must be exercised in granting interlocutory orders for injunctions that seek to restrain the exercise of specific constitutional functions by authorities like INEC….it is by so doing that the court will not constitute itself as a clog in the wheel of the democratic process.”

The courts in the above cases address the reluctance of the court in granting injunctions that may undermine the country’s democracy. This can be inferred to apply to every case; that is, the court is urged to not just interpret the laws or perform their constitutional duties without considering what is obtainable in reality. This is why the courts often consider certain things in interpreting the law, such as the perceived intention of the lawmakers, even when the law made does not depict it. The court will not blind itself with
the Law rather, it will consider what is obtainable in reality.

This can also be seen in the famous diction of Niki Tobi, JSC, in the famous case of Josiah v. State (1985) 1 NWLR (pt. 1) 125 at 141, where he observed that “Justice is not a one-way traffic. It is not only for the appellant. Justice is not even only for the respondent. Justice is for the appellant, the respondent, and the society. Justice is not a whimsical judicial freedom to do whatever a judge likes. Justice is not a discriminatory phenomenon. It is not the palm tree justice of the African traditional society where the village head does what he likes, how he likes, when he likes, and where he likes. Justice is giving each person what he or she deserves.”

This brilliant diction urges the courts to not be blinded by emotions, not by seeking “justice” for the deceased or the state and neglecting the state of the accused. Here, he will have a noble intention, but it may be far from the reality of things and consequently make accused persons lose hope in the judiciary. Neither is any judge expected to be blinded or carried away by the state of the accused person, thereby tilting towards “liberating” the accused and consequently making the complainants and the state at large
to lose hope in the judiciary. This should at all costs be avoided, as the court is not a “Don Quixote” who is always “tilting at windmills.” Otherwise, the court will be deluded into thinking it is performing a noble course while causing more damage. There is no greater damage to the judiciary than loss of public confidence and politicization of the bench.

However, it is not wrong to say that there is a delicate balance between standing up for constitutional values and overstepping the judicial role, and the court is expected to maintain such balance. The court is not expected to go out and seek facts; rather, it is to adjudicate based on facts brought before it. The court is not also bound to interpret the law stricto senso, especially when such interpretation will defeat the purpose of such law, thereby derailing from the reality. The court, no doubt, is the custodian of the law and the “only” hope of a common man but not a “Don Quixote.” Therefore, the court must be neither a passive bystander nor a deluded knight.

The judiciary must wield the sword of justice with wisdom, precision, and constitutional grounding, not fanciful zeal.

REFERENCE

1. Modern Nigerian Election Petitions and Appeals Law (Revised Edition) by Kelechi Peter
   Ikoroha, ESQ.

2. Abaribe v. Abia State House of Assembly (2002) 14 NWLR (pt. 788) at 486 paras F – G

Peter v. Okoye (2002)

3 NWLR (pt. 755) 529 at 554 paras C–E.

4. Josiah v. State (1985) 1 NWLR (pt.1) 125 at 141

Sumayyah Ayomide Ambali, SABUK, Bayero University, Kano. Sumayyah Ambali, SABUK OOL at LinkedIn, ambalisumayyahayomide@gmail.com, 08150698953.

Source: thenigerialawyer