Can Law Enforcement Invoke Constitutional Rights While Disregarding the Law?

CASE TITLE: C.O.P ADAMAWA STATE COMMAND v. PIUS & ANOR (2024) LPELR-61853(CA)

JUDGMENT DATE: 27TH MARCH, 2024

JUSTICES: ITA GEORGE MBABA, JCA
PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, JCA
PETER OYINKENIMIEMI AFFEN, JCA

DIVISION: YOLA

PRACTICE AREA: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

FACTS:
This appeal emanated from a judgment from the Federal High Court of Justice in Yola, Adamawa State, delivered on December 9, 2020, in Suit No. FHC/YL/CS/8/2020.

The 1st Respondent, an employee of the 2nd Respondent, faced suspension and subsequent redeployment. His continued quarrelsome behavior, insubordination, and threats led to his termination and the involvement of the police.

The 2nd Respondent’s counter-affidavit described the 1st Respondent’s unruly behavior and threats, which prompted the police intervention after his termination. The 1st Respondent’s affidavit detailed his detention and alleged torture from May 11 to May 17, 2018, before being charged to Court.

The trial Court found the Appellant liable for unlawfully detaining the 1st Respondent for six days without trial, violating his constitutional rights under Section 35 (5) of the 1999 Constitution. The Court described the detention as inhumane and degrading treatment under Section 34(I)(a) of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court granted the 1st Respondent’s fundamental rights action against the Appellant.
Dissatisfied with this judgment, the Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

ISSUE(S) FOR DETERMINATION:

The appeal was determined based on the sole issue raised by the Respondent thus;

“Whether the trial Court was right when it found that the Fundamental Human Rights of the 1st Respondent were violated by the Appellants.”

COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS:

In arguing the appeal, counsel for the Appellant contended that the 1st Respondent (Applicant) did not present sufficient evidence to support the trial Court’s decision in his favor. He argued that the mere arrest and detention of the Applicant beyond 24 hours was not enough to prove that his fundamental rights were violated. He emphasized that the Applicant’s unruly behavior and threats required Police intervention and investigation. He maintained that the trial Court failed to appreciate these facts and that the Plaintiff must succeed based on the strength of his case, not the weakness of the defendant’s case. He cited several cases to support his arguments, including FIICHARIES ORGAN & ORS VS NLNG and OGOZIE IPEAZU & ORS.

Counsel further argued that the Appellant’s actions were within their constitutional responsibilities to maintain law and order and that detaining the Applicant based on a credible report was justified. He relied on the case of ASARI v. FRN, stating that the right to personal liberty is not absolute. He also cited DUMEZ NIG. LTD. v. NWAKHOBA and BASSEY v. AFIA to assert that a report to the police that discloses a prima facie case cannot result in liability for breach of rights.

Moreover, he argued that the trial Court’s decision was perverse and that granting the application against the Appellant could lead to lawlessness and anarchy. He claimed that the Applicant did not provide proof that the Appellant acted unlawfully. He also contended that the trial Court did not accord the Appellant fair hearing and that decisions must be founded in law, referencing AYOADE v. SPRING BANK PLC.

In response, counsel for the Respondents argued that fundamental rights are superior to ordinary laws and highlighted the Applicant’s illegal detention for six days without trial, which violated Sections 34 and 35 of the 1999 Constitution. He acknowledged the Police’s power to arrest but emphasized that this must be done lawfully. He cited BENSON v. COP & ANOR and stated that the Applicant was subjected to torture and inhuman treatment during detention, which the Appellant did not deny.

Counsel further argued that the Appellant’s actions were highhanded and malicious, demonstrating contempt for the Applicant’s rights. He disputed the applicability of BASSEY v. AFIA and FAWEHINMI v. IGP to the Appellant’s case. He also argued that the damages awarded were minimal given the violation of the Applicant’s dignity.

Additionally, Counsel disputed the Appellant’s claim of being denied a fair hearing, arguing that the trial Court did not grant any relief beyond what was sought. He maintained that the Applicant’s complaint was about the inhuman treatment before being charged to Court, not the arrest itself.
He urged the Court to resolve the issues against the Appellant and dismiss the appeal.

DECISION/HELD:
In the final analysis, the appeal was dismissed and the Appellant was to pay the cost of N200,000.00 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira) to the 1st Respondent.

RATIO:

POLICE – POWERS OF THE POLICE: Whether powers of the Police are subject to the Constitution

“…Appellant cannot claim constitutional right to arrest, detain, interrogate, search, and prosecute suspect, when it acts outside or in contempt of the same laws Appellant relies on. Appellant must act within the confines of the said Constitution and other laws regulating its conduct. It must act in accordance with the law, to be able to enjoy the protection of the law and the Courts. See the case of LIVING MITIN v. C.O.P., BAYELSA (2022) LPELR – 59029 (SC):

“Section 4 of the Police Act sets out the general duties of the Police as follows: “4. The Police shall be employed for the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the protection of life and property, and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged.” In Fawehinmi v. I.G.P. (2002) LPELR-1258 (SC) @ 20 D; (2002) 5 SC (Pt. 1) 63, this Court referred to the definition of Police power as contained in Black’s Law Dictionary 5th Edition at page 1041,, thus: “Police power is the exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare within constitutional limits and as an essential attribute of government.” The duties and powers of the Police are not in doubt. The issue that often raises questions is the manner in which duties are performed or the powers exercised. Sections 35(1)(c) and 41 of the Constitution provide: “35(1) Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty, and no person shall be deprived of such liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure permitted by law—(c) for the purpose of bringing him before a Court in execution of the order of a Court or upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence, or to such extent as may be reasonably necessary to prevent his committing a criminal offence. 35(6) Any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained shall be entitled to compensation and public apology from the appropriate authority or person, and in this subsection, “the appropriate authority or person means an authority or person specified by law.”

In the case of MU’AZU v. THE STATE (2022) LPELR 57315 (CA), this Court held:

“I adopt the judgment as mine and have nothing useful to add except to warn Police Officers that while carrying out their statutory duty of arrest, investigation, and detention, they must do so within the confines of the law and with the fear of God. They are not allowed by law to misuse their statutory power or, indeed, to use their power arbitrarily. Section 341 of the Police Regulations Cap P19 made pursuant to Section 46 of the Police Act makes any Police Officer who misuses his power liable. See Rev. Polycarp Mathew Odiong vs. Assistant Inspector General of Police, Zone 6, Calabar (2013) LPELR-20698 (CA). The apex Court made this point clearly in Chief Gani Fawehinmi vs. IGP & Ors (2002) LPELR-1258 (SC) in these words: “It is inconceivable that such wide powers and duties of the police must be exercised and performed without any discretion left to responsible police operatives. Unless a statute that confers powers or imposes duties expressly or by necessary implication excludes the exercise of discretion or the duty demanded is such that it leaves no room for discretion, it is my view that discretionary powers are implied and, whenever appropriate, exercised for salutary ends. In R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn (1968) 2 Q.B. 118 at 136, Lord Denning M.R. observed, inter alia: “Although the chief officers of police are answerable to the law, there are many fields in which they have discretion with which the law will not interfere.” No Court should accommodate the misuse of power by any Police Officer. The lower Court rightly in my view, did not, and his lordship of this Court in the lead judgment has not. I will also not allow this. I condemn the action of the Appellant. For every human action, there are consequences and so the power-drunk Appellant will have to pay for his action that has claimed human life.” Per TOBI, JCA (Pp. 49–51, paras. C-A)

See also OHANEDUM & ANOR VS. COP (IMO STATE) & ORS. (2015) LPELR-24318 (CA), where it held:
“Of course, the duties of the police under the Police Act, or under the Nigerian Constitution, are circumscribed by the law, and must be performed, lawfully. The police cannot act at large, aligning with mischief makers and criminal elements to become a terror to the citizens and subject law-abiding citizens to harassment, intimidation, and fear.”

The police cannot therefore act, at large, in abuse of its powers, in the name of serving its Constitutional or Statutory duties. The police authorities are expected to take note of the decisions of the Court on their operations and learn to correct themselves and dwell within the law.” Per MBABA, J.C.A.

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